Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 68/414/EEC imposing an obligation on Member States of the EEC to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products. COM (98) 221 final, 14 April 1998 by unknown
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 14.04.1998 
COM(1998) 221 final 
98/0137 (CNS) 
.  .  .. · ..  ·  - · .....  . 
amending J>irective 68J~i41EE:~  .. 
"imposing an.obligation on~Iembi;stat~~~ithe  EEC 
.  . 
to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum 
(presented by the Commission) TABLE OF CONTENTS 
•  EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
•  History & Context 
•  Supply Security 
•  Internal Energy Market 
•  Areas of  Improvement 
•  Conclusion 
•  PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL DIRECTIVE AMENDING DIRECTIVE 
68/414/EEC 
•  ANNEX-TABLES-GRAPHS 
2 ·- _._ ... - .. - ..... - ...... >······  --···-·········-······ 
EXPLANAIOkY••·.MEI\I<l~~til.TM•••·················--···-··-··· 
History & Context 
1.  The current compulsory stockholding systems in the European Union have evolved from 
Council Directive 68/414/EEC which required all Member States to maintain oil  stocks 
for each of  the three main product categories (gasolines, middle distillates, fuel  oils) at a 
minimum level equivalent to 65  days inland consumption of the previous calendar year. 
In  1972, the minimum  stock requirement was  raised to 90 days  consumption  (Council 
Directive 72/425/EEC}, a level which still prevails today. Individual Member States were 
left free to organise their own internal stockholding regimes as they wished in  order to 
comply with the Directive. 
2.  The reasons for having adopted Directive 68/414/EEC can be summarised as follows: 
a)  Oil supply disruptions threaten economic activity.  It is  therefore desirable that 
Member  States  have  stocks  available  in  order to  cope  with  potential  supply 
disruption difficulties and manage the crisis should it reach a critical stage. 
b)  It may be desirable to intervene during the crisis, for, as physical deliveries begin 
to dry up, there is  a risk of price speculation in the market.  It therefore makes 
good economic sense for the authorities to be able to minimise,  or prevent, the 
effects of  a supply crisis by drawing on their security stocks. 
c)  The mere fact that Member States have an important buffer at their disposal is a 
powerful· deterrent which can in itself discourage those who might be tempted to 
create a supply crisis or speculate from it:  the existence of stocks wards off the 
CnSIS. 
3.  The first  stockholding  provisions  adopted  by the  Council  were  based  on  Article  103 
(difficulties in supply of  certain products) of  the Treaty. 
In a broader context, the main objectives of  the above Community legislation were shared 
by OECD  countries  when they  adopted  the  International  Energy  Programme  (IEP)  in 
1974 creating the International Energy Agency (lEA). Despite some technical differences, 
both  CommUnity  and  lEA  provisions  create  a  framework  in  which  the  same  supply 
security principles apply  in  order to  provide a credible and  flexible  response to an  oil 
supply crisis should the need arise. 
3 4.  Since  the  seventies,  the  liberalisation  of economies  and  the  changing  patterns  in  oil 
supply and  demand  and in  industry  structure,  the  introduction  of the  internal  energy 
market and the expected enlargement of  the European Union towards new Member States 
indicate ihat a review of  Community compulsory oil stocks legislation is necessary. 
5.  Previous  attempts  to  update  and  adapt parts of Directive  68/414  (72/425)  were  not 
successful. The most recent  attempt 
1  was overtaken  by events  such as  the  1990  Gulf 
crisis. Interest shifted tO\vards measures to mitigate the effects of  an oil supply crisis and 
towards  strengthening  Community  representation  in  the  lEA.  Subsequently,  the 
Commission returned to a consideration of preventive measures - namely  regarding oil 
stocks - with a view to adapting the  above Directives to recent developments  in  supply 
security. 
6.  In parallel, in  recent years, ten countries from Central and Eastern Europe: (CEEC) and 
Cyprus  have  applied  for  Community  membership.  One  of the  prerequisites  for  such 
membership is compliance \\ith the Community "acquis". Most candidates have already 
initiated procedures to transpose the Community Directive on stocks into their national 
legislation. A recent Commission
3 workshop showed that the obligation to build security 
stocks equal to 90 days of the  previous year's consumption is  a difficult task which is 
creating a heavy financial burden for these countries. As oil  consumption is  expected to 
rise  substantially in  these countries,  it  is  essential that they  put in  place  efficient and 
transparent stockholding mechanisms. Today the task of the Community and its Member 
States  is  to  lead  the  way  by  adopting  and  implementing  efficient,  transparent  and 
consistent stockholding arrangements in  order to create a coherent framework to be used 
by  candidate  Member States  when  building  security  stocks  and  setting  up  stockdraw 
mechanisms. Such a framework must be based on updated Community kgislation for the 
benefit of  all. 
7.  A review of issues concerning compulsory security oil  stocks  was  recently  undertaken 
under Commission co-ordination by the  Oil  Supply Group (OSG).  a group of national 
experts from the fifteen Member States created by Council Directive 73/238/EEC-l.This 
work, paralkl consultation with the  industry and a specialised study carried out in  1997 
demonstrate that it  is  desirable  to  improve  the  existing  legislation  (Council  Directive 
68/414/EEC as ~ended  by Directive 72/425/EEC) in order to ensure: 
a)  the  existence  of efficient,  reliable  and  consistent  stockholding  regimes  and 
mechanisms in  all  l\1ember  States so as to  provide the appropriate co-ordinated 
response when needed: 
b)  transparency  in  stockholding  arrangements  and  the  reinforcement  of the  level 
playing field in the internal oil market. 
1  C0~1(90) 514 final of 22.1 1.90. 
:Bulgaria, Estonia, Czech Republic. Hungary. Latvia. Lithuania. Poland. Slovenia, Slovak Republic and 
Romania. 
3 DG XVII & DG XVffAIEX Workshop. Brussels. 1.07.97. 
4 OJ N° L 228, 16.08.1973, p.  1 8.  Consequently,  based  on  Article  103a  of the  Treaty,  security  of supply  issues  are 
considered in the present Directive Proposal in relation to the Internal Energy Market. 
Supplv Securitv 
9.  Security of supply  remains  a major  issue  for  the  Community.  Since  the  Community  will 
continue to  depend heavily on imported  oil  and  forecasts  indicate high  oil  demand  in  other 
regions of  the world as well, there is an ongoing need for vigilance in both the short and long 
tenn. More than three quarters of  proven world oil reserves are located in potentially unstable 
areas and this highlights the continuing requirement for measures, adapted where necessary to 
changing market circumstances, to  meet the possibility  of sudden  supply disruptions  \Vhich 
\vould be highly diunaging for the world and Community economies. The main justification for 
holding security stocks is the need to cover risks associated \Vith potential supply disruptions, a 
principle also shared by the lEA  · 
10.  The risk of  a very serious threat to the Community's security of  oil supply is considered to be 
of  a different nature today than in the past.  Conditions have changed from the crisis/sub-crisis 
situations which existed some twenty years ago. when crude and product supply sources and 
markets were much less diversified, less transparent and less efficient than they are today
5
. 
ll.  Although the precise nature of the potential threat to oil supplies may change over time, 
the  importance of stable and  secure  oil  imports  to  the  Community's economies  means 
that  security  stocks  will  remain  a  crucial  part  of Government  policy.  The  need  for 
vigilance is more acute if  consideration is given to the recent trends and developments in the 
geo-political and competitive environment in which global oil supply and demand is to be 
considered. 
12.  The confirmed trend observed since the end of the eighties in the oil  industry towards cost 
reduction by holding the least possible oil stocks is  expected to continue and intensify in 
the future.  Since 1980, industry stocks have fallen  by about 25  consumption days.  Only 
the creation and maintenance of stocks under Government control has, to a certain extent, 
reversed the do\mward trend.  However, the trend tO\vards  such stocks has  slowed do\\n 
in  the  nineties,  as  fewer  and  fewer  Governments  seem  to  be  convinced  of the  need  to 
maintain security stocks. 
13.  As  the oil  industry has developed  in  a more competitive environment,  \\ ith a decreasing 
number  of '·national"  companies  as  a  result  of extensive  privatisation  programmes, 
companies are increasingly adopting commercial attitudes towards how they do business. 
They are more and more reluctant to accept that they have a "strategic"" responsibility for 
maintaining the flow of oil to end-users in the event of an international supply disruption. 
The  cutback  in  company  stocks  has  taken  two  forms:  reductions  in  surplus  capacity 
(such  as  refineries,  storage  and  distribution  depots,  etc.,  thus  improving  the  overall 
efficiency of  operations) and cutbacks in "discretionary" stocks
6
. 
5 COM(96)  1~3: ··Report on the situation of oil supply, refining and markets in the EC'. 
6 ""Discretionary" or  "commercial" stocks: see annex for definitions. 
5 14.  The  use  by  the  industry,  but  also  by  certain  stockholding  entities,  of the  so-called 
"delegated"
7 stocks has been intensified in recent years mainly as a cheaper solution to 
cover the  storage obligation both  at national  and Community level.  Being mainly  co-
mingled operating stocks, "delegated" stocks are more difficult to identify and control. As 
a result, their potential availability to consumers in a supply disruption could be put into 
doubt. The "usability" of stocks  in  an oil disruption and Government powers to ensure 
control of stocks are interrelated issues which are addressed both at EU and IENOECD 
level 
8
. 
15.  In 1995, the Commission presented to the Council an integrated approach for action in 
the field of energy in the White Paper on an "Energy Policy for the European l)nion'.9. 
l)lis document reaffirmed the importance of energy supply security for the Community 
by placing security of supply alongside competitiveness and environmental protection as 
the three pillars of energy policy in the European Union.  The Community's external oil 
dependence  can  be  best  managed  through  diversification  of supply,  development  of 
international  relations  with  oil  producers  and  provisions  concerning  oil  stocks  and 
measures to  mitigate  difficulties  arising from  oil  supply  shortages.  All  measures .and 
provisions envisaged regarding the above fields must be in line with the internal market in 
the Community. 
16.  .  By re-affirming the importance of oil supply security, the Council in the conclusions of 
its meeting of  December 1996 recognised the fact "that the Community will continue to 
depend heavily on imported oil and that there is an ongoing need for vigilance in both the 
short and long term",  as  "more  than three  quarters  of proven  world  oil  reserves  are 
located in potentially sensitive areas". In addition, the Council highlighted "the continuing 
requirement to maintain existing  measures  such as  stockholding  procedures  and crisis 
management mechanisms,  which  may  be  adapted where necessary to changing market 
circumstances." 
10
• 
17.  Concerning the implementation of Community legislation, the Commission monitors the 
level of stocks in Member States on a regular and periodic basis through the reporting 
mechanism  introduced  by  Directive  68/414/EEC,  supported  where  possible  by  other 
statistical data. As a result of this process, the Commission concludes that, as far as the 
three main oil  product categories are concerned,  several Member States have not been 
able  to  maintain  the  minimum  level  of stocks  according  to  their  legal  obligation  for 
several months 
11
• 
18.  The lEA Ministerial Governing Board of May  1997 reaffirmed that despite the evolution 
of the oil markets towards greater competition, transparency and efficiency, oil security 
remains  a  serious  concern,  particularly  given  the  prospect  of  increasing  import 
dependence and the increasing concentration of remaining oil reserves in the Middle East. 
The Board concluded that there is no room for complacency but a need to enhance efforts 
to  provide  for  flexible  and  credible  responses  to  any  emergency  by keeping  response 
mechanisms fully up to date,  as  well  as to maintain and - in countries \\ith weak stock 
positions- improve the level of  stocks. 
7 "Delegated", "ticket", or "consigned" stocks: see annex for definitions. 
8 "Future Strategies for lEA Emergency Reserves", IEA/SEQ(97)7/REV1 of 1.10.97, and '·Report to the 
Governing Board on IEA Emergency Reserve Issues", n° IEA/SEQ(97)42 of 5.1 L97. 
9 COM(95) 682 final of 13.12.95. 
1°  Council Conclusions on the "Report on the situation of oil supply.  refining and markets in the EC", 
PRESL96/356- 03/12/96. 
11  Reference period:  1.01.95- 1.07.97. 
6 19. 
20. 
In the relevant Standing Group,  as part of the lEA's monitoring of the level of stocks, 
several  IEA  countries  have  been  pinpointed  for  not  respecting  their  minimum  stock 
obligation. 
Based on the above context, as far as oil supply security is concerned, the Commission is 
proposing modifications  to  Directive  681414/EEC.  These modifications  do  not  aim to 
change the fundamentals of  the Community stockholding system. Their aim is  to improve' 
and  adapt  the  modalities  of this  system  mainly  based  on  certain  common  basic 
stockholding  criteria  and  requirements,  clarify  certain  issues  and  simplify  provisions 
where this  is  possible. The focal  point of the proposed improvements  is  to ensure that 
security  stocks  are  fully  at  the  disposal  of Member  States  in  the  event  of supply 
difficulties and that Member States possess the legal and administrative powers to be in 
control of  these stocks in order to draw on them when it is necessary. 
Internal Energy Market 
21.  The entry  into  force  of the  internal  market  and  the  establishment of an  area without 
internal  frontiers  implies  that  products  can  move  from  one  Member State  to  another 
\\ithout legal, technical, administrative or fiscal obstacles. It also implies that, in a spirit 
of Community solidarity, the  stockholding burden is  shared by all  Member States in an 
equitable, transparent and efficient way. 
22.  The process  of the  liberalisation  of oil  n.arkets  requires  that  national  markets  cannot 
operate with barriers. A level  playing field  based on market transparency and neutrality 
for all operators is therefore necessary and is  a basic criterion for the proper functioning 
ofthe internal energy market.  It is  essential that this criterion is  respected by all national 
stockholding  regimes  in  the  Community  be  they  "centralised"  (''entity  I  agency"  or 
Government "strategic'' stocks) or "de-centralised" ("company I industry" stocks)
12
. As a 
principle, stockholding arrangements must not be an obstacle to the entry to, or exit from, 
the market, or to the free movement of  oil products \\ithin the Community. 
23.  A number of  market operators claim that they are not being treated equally vis-a-vis their 
market competitors, as inequalities can be created by: 
a)  the  disproportionate  application  of the  stockholding  obligation  to  the  various 
~pes of  market operators; 
b)  the disproportionate distribution of  the stockholding costs amongst those with the 
obligation to maintain security stocks; 
c)  the  partial  use  of the  industry  operating  stocks  as  "delegated"  stock;  some 
operators are able to do  this  and others, because of their different structure and 
activity, are not; 
d)  unfair conditions imposed on  importers and distributors in order to benefit from 
"ddegated'' stockholding  by domestic  refmers,  such as  the  requirement to sign 
long-term purchase contracts with the latter. 
1
:  .. Centralised" vs ...  de-centralised" stockholding systems: details in the annex. 
7 24.  Under  current  provlSlons,  inequalities  can  also  be  created  between  market  operators 
established in  a  Member  State allowing  oil  storage  in  another  Member State through 
specific Governmental agreements (Article 6.2 of Directive 68/414/EEC), and operators 
in a Member State forbidding such a practice. These agreements, however, have always 
been considered to be a useful means for increasing the proper functioning of  the internal 
market in the oil sector, at the same time allowing control by a Member State over stocks 
\Vhich are held outside its territory. Although Member State Governments decide whether 
or not to store oil  in another Member State, in  reaching a decision, they must take into 
account: 
a)  the economic  reality  of a frontierless  internal  market,  where  the  movement of 
goods from one Member State to another  should be unhindered; and 
b)  the need for oil companies to operate on a European level and therefore to reduce 
costs and optimise stockholding obligations. 
25.  Procedures aiming at establishing. such agreements  can  impose  a  heavy administrative 
burden  on  Governments,  depending  on  the  internal  administrative  structures  in  each 
Member State. The airn ofthe proposed amendments to Directive 68/414/EEC is to cover 
the  minimum  Community-wide  requirements.  Member  States  complying  with  these 
requirements should be able to establish agreements without major difficulties provided 
they also develop internally more simple procedures to do so. 
26.  Having taken  into  account  the  above  issues,  the  proposed  modifications  to  Directive 
68/414/EEC provide the  necessary  improvements to Community  storage  arrangements 
within the internal market, vvithout hindering supply security considerations. As far as the 
internal  market  is  concerned,  the  focal  point  of the  proposed  modifications  is  the 
existence of transparent stockholding  arrangements  in  every  Member State  in  order to 
strengthen the level playing field in the Community. 
Areas of Improvement 
Improvements to Community legislation are proposed along the following lines: 
13 
2 7.  Dero~ration  to  the  stockholdin~r  obli~ration  of  Member  States  with  indigenous  oil 
production: 
Member States producing oil  indigenously have the  right  to  deduct  from  their 
internal consumption the percentage corresponding to this indigenous production. 
Review  of this  issue  took  into  account,  amongst  other  iss~es,  the  legal  and 
administrative powers of the Governments concerned to control the  use of their 
stocks and their oil  output if need  arises  in an oil  crisis  situation.  Taking into 
account the  fact  that  only  the  United  Kingdom  and  Denmark  benefit  from  an 
increase of such a derogation, the maximum derogation ceiling could be raised to 
25%.  Indeed,  the  indigenous.  oil  production  of these  two  main  Community 
producers  corresponds  to  25% of the  total  EU-15  oil  consumption of the  last 
13  Order of appearance in the attached Directive Proposal. 
8 three years
14
•  In practice, since the derogation percentage is  deducted from the 
"average daily internal consumption", the stockholding obligation remains equal 
to 90 days for all Member States. 
28.  Statistical reporting 1:  Calculation of internal consumption: 
For the sake of  coherence, the calculation and statistical reporting of stocks must 
obev basic  common  rules  for all  Member States.  It is  therefore  necessary to 
adopt definitions and approaches already agreed in the past at Community
15  and 
international level (EUROSTAT, OECD/IEA, UN)
16 as far as oil consumption is 
concerned  and,  therefore,  adopt  fully  the  practice  followed  by  a  very  large 
majority of Member States, namely to include international aviation bunkers in 
internal consumption. This measure will be accompanied by a separate reporting 
of ')et fuel of the kerosene type", the consumption of which is gro\\ing rapidly, 
without however imposing any specific obligation on this product. 
29.  Qualitv of  stockholding mechanisms -Administrative suoervision of stocks: 
a)  Oil  supply security  is  improved  if the  quality  of stockholding  mechanisms  is 
enhanced. It is important that security stocks are at the full  disposal of Member 
States should difficulties arise. For this to happen, stocks must be - at all times -
available and accessible.  Such criteria are respected in  a  more efficient way in 
Member States which possess the legal and administrative powers to put security 
stocks and stockdraw procedures under their control in  order to use stocks ·when 
and where they are mostly needed. Efficient accounting and control mechanisms 
are needed, together with an enforr:ement procedure including sanctions for those 
not respecting their legal stockholding obligation. 
b)  In  general,  stockholding  arrangements  should  be  fair  and  not  creating 
discriminations.  Transparency  helps  avoid  discrimination  and  establish  fair 
conditions  in  the  market.  Transparent  arrangements  give  the  possibility  to 
operators to be aware of  their rights and obligations as the cost of compulsory oil 
storage  is  identified and  known.  Therefore,  such identification  needs  to  be as 
precise as possible. In any case, the stockholding cost is part of the final product 
price in the market. 
c)  The abovementioned criteria apply equally to all stocks whether held on national 
or Community territory.  Experience shows  that compliance  with  these  criteria 
can be achieved more efficiently and with fewer  difficulties  in  Member States 
having set up stockholding arrangements where all, or a large part, of stocks are 
maintained under the auspices of, or directly under,  Government control  (eight 
Member  States  have  '·entity/agency  stocks"  and/or  Government  "strategic 
stocks"
17 
- others  are  planning  to  set  up  similar systems
18
).  In  particular,  in 
14  1994, 1995 and 1996. 
15 i.e.: "Energy- Glossarium", 1991, EUROSTAT. 
16 Oil Annual Questionnaire. QUEST/OIL/1/REVl. common questionnaire adopted by EUROSTAT, 
lEA and United Nations. 
17 See annexes for definitions. 
18 Italy is the most recent example: a new law establishing a stockholding agency was proposed for 
adoption in Februal)· 1998. 
9 Member States where stocks  are maintained by  a  stockholding  body  or entity 
O\\ming  all,  or a large part, of the total stock obligation, there is  no  particular 
difficulty respecting the Community stock obligation; these Member States have 
a  comfortable  90-day  stock  position,  or  above,  in  recent  years.  It has  been 
observed that, follO\ving the establishment of such entities, total stocks increase. 
The main reason is  that entity stocks are usually built on  top of the  operating 
stocks of  the industry which exist anyway for industry operations. 
Stockholding bodies/entities usually distribute the stockholding obligation to their 
members,  refiners and non-refiners, through an identified fee  or levy calculated 
on the obligation of  each of  these t\vo groups of operators. This type of financing 
is  preferred: although it  is  generally guaranteed by the Government,  it does not 
depend on Government budget.  The latter may be \ulnerable to decisions based 
on  situations  other  than  oil  disruptions.  Stockholding  bodies  or entities  can 
develop  a  close  Government/industry  partnership  which  is  necessary  for  the 
maintenance and use of security stocks and essential for the proper and efficient 
functioning of  the oil market. 
30.  Statistical reporting II: Conversion methods and reporting time 
~  · -Flexibility  implies  that stocks  can be  maintained  in  the  form  of crude  oil  and 
intermediate products and/or in the form  of finished products.  Decisions on this 
issue can be better tackled at local level depending on the needs of the market and 
the strategic decisions of each Member State. In order to simplify the conversion 
of crude oil  into  product equivalent,  it  is  proposed to  abandon one  conversion 
method and keep  the  other two which provide adequate flexibility of choice  in 
maintaining stocks of crude oil and/or finished oil products. 
b)  Reporting time  is  aligned to that of the  International  Energy  Agency.  Member 
States  \\ill send to the  Commission their  statistical summary  reports,  showing 
stocks  existing at the  end  of each  month,  at the  latest by  the  25th day of the 
second  month  after the  month  to  be  reported.  The  annual  consumption,  upon 
which stock levels are calculated, is proposed to change on 31  March every year. 
31.  Stocks held in other Member States: 
a)  A Member State Government has the  right, if it  so wishes, to maintain security 
stocks  in  the  Community  by  establishing  framework-agre.ements  with  the 
Government  of  another  Member  State  and  thus  cover  all,  or  part  of  its 
stockholding  obligation.  Decisions  to  establish  such  an  agreement  - giving 
therefore the green  light for  subsequent contracts between  undertakings to  hold 
their stocks elsewhere in the Community - should take into account the quality of 
stockholding  mechanisms  in  the  host  Member  State.  In  case  of  supply 
difficulties,  the  beneficiary  Member  State  must be  able  to  request  and  obtain 
repatriation  of its  stocks  in  order  to  draw  upon  them  for  consumer  benefit. 
10 Additional new clauses proposed define: 
i)  provisions on availability, control and repatriation of  stocks. 
li)  clauses concerning the reporting of  stocks; 
iii)  a  frame\vork  for  "delegated" stocks  held  as  a  result of an  agreement, 
focusing on: 
a)  the repatriation of  stocks; 
b)  the delegation period; 
c)  the identification of  stocks. 
b)  Efficient monitoring of the  Community situation implies  that stock movements 
between Member States \\ill be reported to the Commission (the practice already 
followed today) and that the Commission is kept informed about the conditions of 
either the existence of  an agreement between Governments, or the absence of  it. 
32.  Sanctions: 
Conclusion 
A  regime  is  introduced  concerning  sanctions  imposed  by  Member  States  on 
undertakings not respecting legislation on security stocks. Implementation is left 
to Member State  Governments.  Sanctions  must be  effective,  proportional  and 
dissuasive. 
In  the  light  of the  above,  the  Commission  proposes  to  the  Council  for  adoption  a 
Directive with specific amendments to Council Directive 68/414/EEC.  . 
The Commission will  report to  the  Council regularly on  the situation and developments 
concerning security oil stocks. This report will include statistical analyses of stock levels 
in  the  Community  and  their  interpretation,  details  on  individual  agreements  between 
Member  States  maintaining  stocks  in  another  Member  State  and  other  relevant 
information concerning the implementation of  the Directive. 
II ~ro~~~:lf~r  a Council DireCtiv~  amendillg:tii;~~tive 68/414/EEC 
"imposing an obligation on Member States of the EEC to maintain minimum 
stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products" 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEA'\; UNION, 
Having regard to the  Treaty establishing  the  European  Community,  and  in  particular Article 
103a{l) thereof; 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission; 
Having regard to the Opinion ofthe European Parliament; 
Having regard to the Opinion of  the Economic and Social Committee; 
\Vhereas the Council has adopted the Directive of 20 December 1968
19  imposing an obligation on 
Member States of the European Economic Community to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil 
and/or petroleum products 
Whereas  imported crude oil  and  petroleum  products  continue  to  play an  important  role  in  the 
Community's  energy  supplies;  \vhereas  any  difficulty,  even  temporary.  having  the  effect  of 
reducing supplies of such products, or significantly increasing the price thereof on international 
markets,  could cause serious disturbances in  the  economic activity of the Community; whereas 
the Community must be in a position to offset or at least to diminish any harmful effects in such a 
case;  whereas it is  necessary to  update  Directive  68/414/EEC adapting  it to the  reality of the 
internal market of  the Community and the evolution of  the oil markets; 
19 OJ N° L 308. 23.12.1968. p.  l~; Dirccti\e last amended by Directive 72/~25/EEC (OJ W  L 291, 
28.12.1972, p.  15~) 
12 Whereas  in  Directive  73/23 8/EEC of 24  July  1973 
20  the  Council  decided  upon  appropriate 
measures - including drawing on oil stocks - to be taken in the event of difficulties in the supply 
of  crude oil and petroleum products to the Community; whereas Member States have undertaken 
similar obligations in the Agreement on an "International Energy Program"
21
; 
Whereas it is important that the security of  oil supply is enhanced; 
Whereas  it  is  necessary that the  organisational arrangements  for  oil  stocks  ensure the  smooth 
running of  the internal market; 
Whereas  the  provisions  of this  Directive  do  not  affect  the  full  application  of the  Treaty,  m 
particular the provisions concerning the internal market and competition; 
Whereas; in accordance \\ith the principle of  subsidiarity and in accordance \\ith the principle of 
proportionality such as stipulated in Article 3 B of  the Treaty, the objective of maintaining a high 
level of security of oil  supply in  the  Community through  reliable  and transparent mechanisms 
based on solidarity amongst Member States and, at the same time, complying with the rules of  the 
internal  market  and  competition,  can  be  carried  out  more  adequately  at  the  level  of the 
Conununit.y; \Vhereas therefore this  Directive  is  limited to the minimum requirements to achieve 
this objective and does not exceed what is necessary to this end; 
\"Vhereas  it is necessary that stocks are at the disposal of Member States should difficulties in oil 
supply arise; whereas Member States must possess the powers and the capacity to control the use 
of stocks  so that they can be made a\ailable promptly for the  benefit of the  areas which  most 
need oil supplies: 
Whereas  organisational  arrangements  for  the  n1aintenance  of stocks  must  ensure  the  stocks' 
availability and their accessibility to the consumer; 
:o OJ W L 228. 16.08.1973. p.  l. 
:I As last amended on 7th August  1992. 
13 Whereas  it is  appropriate that organisational  arrangements  for  the  maintenance  of stocks  are 
transparent,  ens~ring a fair and non-discriminatory  sharing of the  burden of the  stock-holding 
obligation; whereas, therefore, the cost of holding oil stocks should be identified in the final price 
of  the oil products sold in the market concerned; 
Whereas, in order to organise the maintenance of stocks as indicated above, Member States may 
have recourse to a system based on a stockholding body or entity which will hold all, or part, of 
the  stocks  making  up  their  stockholding  obligation;  whereas  the  balance,  if any,  should  be 
maintained by refiners and other market operators; whereas partnership between the Government 
and the industry is essential to operate efficient and reliable stockholding mechanisms; 
Whereas  high  national  production  contributes  in  itself to  security  of supply;  whereas  the  oil 
market evolution can justify a higher. maximum derogation from  the obligation to  maintain oil 
stocks for Member States with indigenous oil production; 
Whereas it is appropriate to adopt approaches which are already followed by the Community and 
the  Member  States  \\ithin  their  international  obligations  and  agreements;  whereas,  owing  to 
changes  in  the  pattern  of oil  consumption,  international  aviation  bunkers  have  become  an 
important component ofthis consumption; whereas these bunkers are part of inland consumption; 
\vbereas there  is  a need to  adapt and  simplify the  Community  statistical  reporting mechanism 
concerning oil stocks; 
\vbereas oil  stocks can,  in  principle,  be  held  anywhere  in  the  Community and,  therefore,  it  is 
appropriate  to  facilitate  the  establishment  of stocks  outside  national  territory:  whereas  it  is 
necessary that decisions for holding stocks outside national territory are taken by the Government 
of the  Member  State  concerned  according  to  its  needs  and  supply  security  considerations; 
whereas  in  the  case  of "delegated"  stocks,  more  detailed  rules  are  needed  to  guarantee  their 
availability and accessibility in the event of  oil supply difficulties; 
Whereas  it  is  appropriate to strengthen the  administrative  supervision of stocks  and establish 
efficient mechanisms for the control and verification of stocks; whereas a regime of sanctions is 
necessary to impose such a control; 
l~ Whereas Council Directive 72/425/EEC of 19  December  1972  raised from  65  to 90  days the 
reference period appearing at the first indent of Article 1 of Directive 68/414/EEC and foresaw 
the conditions to implement this  increase; whereas the provisions of that Directive have become 
obsolete by this Directive; whereas Directive 72/425/EEC must therefore be repealed; 
Whereas it is  appropriate to inform the  Council on a  regular basis on the situation concerning 
security stocks in the Conununity; 
HAS ADOPTED TillS DIRECTIVE : 
15 Article 1 
Directive 68/414/EEC is amended as follows: 
1) Article 1 is replaced by the following text: 
"Article I 
1.  Member States shall adopt such laws,  regulations or administrative provisions as may be 
appropriate in  order to  maintain \\ithin the territory· of the  European  Community  a!  all 
times, subject to the provisions of Article 7, their stocks of petroleum products at a level 
corresponding, for each of the categories of petroleum products listed in Article 2, to at 
least 90 days' average daily internal consumption in the preceding calendar year. 
2.  That part of internal consumption met by derivatives of petroleum produced indigenously 
by the Member State concerned may  be deducted up to a maximum of 25  % of the said 
consumption." 
2)  Article 2 is deleted. 
3)  Article 3 becomes Article 2 and is supplemented by the following paragraph: 
"Bunker supplies for  sea-going vessels  shall not be  included  in  the calculation of internal 
consumption. Bunker supplies for  international aviation shall be included in the calculation 
of internal consumption". 
16 4)  Article 3 hereafter is inserted: 
"Article 3 
1.  Stocks maintained according to Article  1 shall  be  fully  at the disposal of Member States 
should difficulties arise in obtaining oil supplies. Member States spall ensure they have the 
legal powers to control the use of  stocks in such circumstances. 
At all other times,  Member States shall  ensure the availability and accessibility of these 
stocks;  they  shall  establish  arrangements  allowing  for  the  identification,  accounting  and 
control ofthe stocks. 
2.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  fair  and  non-discriminatory  conditions  apply  in  their 
stockholding arrangements. 
The cost burden resulting from  the  maintenance of stocks according to  Article  1 shall be 
identified  by  transparent  arrangements  in  the  final  product  price  of the  oil  products 
concerned.  In  case  stocks  are  m·aintained  solely  by  commercial  undertakings,  the 
stockholding cost burden may be indicative. 
3.  To fulfil  the  requirements  of paragraphs  1 and  2,  Member  States  may  decide  to  have 
recourse to a stockholding body or entity which \Vill  be responsible for holding all or part of 
the stocks. 
Two, or more Member States may decide to have  recourse to a joint stockholding body or 
entity.  In that case they  shall  be jointly responsible for the  obligations  deriving from  this 
Directive." 
17 5)  Article 4 is replaced by the following text: 
"Article 4: 
Member  States  shall  submit  to  the  Commission  a  statistical  summary  showing  stocks 
existing at the  end of each  month,  dra\\n up  in  accordance  with  Articles  5  and  6  and 
specifying the number of  days of  average consumption in the preceding calendar year which 
those stocks represent. This summary must be submitted at the latest by the 25th day of the 
second month after the month to be reported. 
The annual consumption,  upon which the  new  stockholding obligation is  calculated, shall 
change on 31  March every year. 
In the statistical sununary, stocks of  jet fuel of  the kerosene type shall be ·reported separately 
under category II." 
6)  Article 5 is replaced by the following text: 
'·Article 5 
Stocks  required to be  maintained by Article  1 may  be  maintained in  the  form  of crude  oil  and 
intermediate products, as well as in the fonn of finished products. 
In  the  statistical  sununary  of stocks  provided  for  in  Article  4,  finished  products  shall  be 
accounted for  according to their actual  tonnage;  crude  oil  and intermediate  products  shall  be 
accounted for: 
in  the  proportions  of the  quantities  for  each  category  of product  obtained  during  the 
preceding calendar year from the refineries of the State concerned; or 
on  the  basis  of the  ratio  between  the  total  quantity  manufactured  during  the  preceding 
calendar year in  the  State concerned  of products  covered  by  the  obligation  to  maintain 
stocks and the total amount of crude oil used during that year; the foregoing shall apply to 
18 not more than 40% of  the total obligation for the first and second categories (petrol and gas 
oils), and to not more than 50% for the tlllrd category (fuel oils). 
Blending components, when intended for processing into the finished products listed in Article 2, 
may be substituted for the products for which they are intended." 
7)  Article 6 is amended as follows: 
a)  Paragraph 1 is replaced by the follov.ing text: 
"1.  When  calculating  the  level  of minimum  stocks  provided  for  in  Article  1,  only  those 
quantities  which  would  be  held  in  accordance  with  Article  3  shall  be  included  in  the 
statistical summary". 
b)  Paragraph 2 is replaced by the following text: 
''2.  For the purposes of  implementing this Directive, stocks may be established, under individual 
agreements between Governments, within the territory of  a Member State for the account of 
undertakings established in another Member State. 
In such cases, the Member State on whose territory the stocks are held under the framework 
of such an agreement shall  not  oppose the  transfer of these  stocks  to  the  other Member 
States for the account of which stocks are held under that agreement;  it  shall keep a check 
on such stocks in accordance \\ith the  procedures specified in  that agreement but shall not 
include them in  its  statistical summary.  The Member State on whose behalf the stocks are 
held may include them in its statistical summar)". 
Together with the statistical summary pro\ided for by Article 4, each 1\kmber State shall 
send a  report to the Commission concerning the stocks maintained within  its  O\\TI territory 
' 
for the benefit of another Member State, as well as the stocks held in  other Member States 
for its O\\n benefit. In both cases, the storage locations, quantities and product category - or 
crude oil - stored viill be indicated in the report. 
19 Drafts  of the  agreements  mentioned  in  the  first  subparagraph  shall  be  sent  to  the 
Commission,  which  may make  its  comments  known to the Governments  concerned.  The 
agreements, once concluded, shall be notified to the Commission,  \Vhich  shall make them 
known to the other Member States. 
Any Member State which decides not to maintain stocks in another Member State within the 
framework of such agreements shall  inform the Commission about the  reasons for such a 
decision. 
Agreements shall satisfy the follov.ing conditions: 
-they must relate to crude oil and to all petroleum products covered by this Directive; 
-they must lay dO\m conditions and arrangements for the maintenance of stocks with the aim 
of  safeguarding control and availability of  these stocks; 
-they must specify the procedures for checking and identifying the stocks provided for; 
-they must as a general rule be concluded for an unlimited period; 
-they must state that, where provision is  made for unilateral termination, the latter shall not 
operate in the event of a supply crisis and that, in  any event, the Commission shall  receive 
prior information of  any termination. 
\Vhen  stocks  established  under  such  agreements  are  not  O\\ned  by  the  undertaking,  or 
body/entity,  which  has  an obligation  to  hold  stocks~ but are  delegated  to this  undertaking,  or 
body/entity, by another undertaking, or body/entity, the following conditions shall be met: 
-the beneficiary undertaking, or body/entity, must have the contractual right to acquire these 
stocks  during  the  delegation  period;  the  methodology  for  establishing  the  price  of such 
acquisition must be agreed between the parties concerned; 
-the minimum delegation period must be 90 days; 
20 -st~rage location, quantity and category of  product, or crude oil, stored in that location must 
be specified." 
c)  Paragraph 3, second indent, is replaced by the following text: 
"Consequently  the  following  shall,  in  particular,  be  excluded  from  the  statistical  summary: 
indigenous crude oil  not yet extracted; supplies  intended for the bunkers of sea-going vessels; 
supplies in direct transit apart from the stocks referred to in paragraph 2; supplies in pipelines, in 
road tankers and rail tank-wagons, in the storage tanks of retail outlets, and those held by small 
consumers.  Quantities held  by the armed forces  and those held for them by the oil  companies 
shall also be excluded from the statistical summary." 
8)  Article 6a hereafter is inserted: 
"Article 6a 
Member States shall adopt all the necessary provisions and take all the necessary measures to 
ensure control and supervision of  stocks. They shall put in place mechanisms to verify the stocks 
according to the provisions ofthis Directive." 
9)  Article 6b hereafter is inserted: 
"Article 6b 
Member States shall determine the sanctions applicable to the violation of  the national provisions 
made  pursuant  to  this  Directive,  and  shall  take  any  measure  necessary  to  ensure  the 
implementation of these  provisions.  Sanctions  must be  effective,  proportional  and  dissuasive. 
Member States shall  notify these  provisions to the  Commission at the  latest on  31  December 
1999, as well as any later modification concerning them, as soon as possible." 
21 Article 2: 
Directive 72/425/EEC is hereby repealed as from 31 December 1999. 
Article 3: 
1.  Member States shall adopt and publish the necessary measures to comply \\ith this Directive 
before  31  December  1999.  They  shall  infonn the  Commission  immediately thereof.  They 
apply these provisions as from 1 January 2000. 
2.  When Member States adopt these pro\isions, they shall contain a reference to this Directive 
or shall be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of  their official publication. The 
methods of  making such reference shall be laid down by Member States. 
Article 4: 
The Commission shall submit regularly to the Council a report on the situation concerning stocks 
in the Community, as  required by Directive 68/414/EEC. The first report shall be submitted to 
the Council during the second year following the date stipulated in Article 3  ( 1). 
Article 5: 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
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1  Clear  definitions  establish  consistency  and  common  understanding.  The  definitions 
below aim to serve as a reference to discussions on stocks and stockholding issues. 
2  In general, since stocks are normally held for security purposes,  it  is  understood that 
the· term  "securitv stocks" will  be  used  to  broadly  describe  all  oil  stocks  held  for 
potential use in an oil supply crisis. 
3  The term "compulsorv stocks" is used \vhen reference is made to the minimum security 
stock obligations of 90 days' consumption imposed by Community regulations. 
4  SecuritY stocks can also be divided into: 
4.1  '·Strategic  stocks",  which  are  stocks  held  separately  under  control  of 
Governments with central budget finance  (i.e.  Strategic Petroleum Reserve. in 
USA, Government-o\\ned stockpiles in Germany and Japan): 
4.2  '"Entitv/agencv stocks" which  are held  under the  management and control of 
official  stockholding  entities  or  agencies  (sometimes  held  separately  by  an 
independent  entity,  sometimes  held  by  oil  companies  under  central 
entity/agency  responsibility),  financed  by  a  fee  or  levy  divided  amongst 
member market operators  (i.e.  ELG in  Austria,  FDO in  Denmark, NESA in 
Finland,  CPSSP/SAGESS  in  France,  EBV  in  Germany,  NOR.-\  in  Ireland, 
COVA  in  the  Netherlands,  CORES  in  Spain).  In  the  l\kmber  States  \\ith 
entity/agency stocks, these are part of  the compulsory stocks hdd as a result of 
the Community obligation: 
4.3  '·Companv/industrv stocks" are stocks held directly by the oil industry. 
5  In addition,  definitions of a more technical  character can  be  used to  clarify different 
types of  stocks: 
5.1  '·Technical  Minimum  Operatinl!  Stocks/Requirement"  (T-;o..tOS  or  T-MOR) 
are stocks necessary to keep oil  industry facilities technically operable (i.e.  oil 
inside refining networks, pipelines, etc.), without which operations would have 
to  shut dov.n  - even  if these  volumes  could actually  be  physically  removed, 
which is open to considerable doubt. 
5.2  "Normal Minimum Operating Stocks/Requirement'' (N-MOS or N-MOR) are 
stocks  required  in  addition  to  T-l\tOS by  the oil  industry to  conduct normal 
operations  which  can  be  described  as  operations  which  can  be  conducted 
without  signs  of shortages  ("tightness')  developing  in  supply/distribution 
systems. N-MOS are the level  of stocks at (or below) which the  first  signs of 
problems  in  maintaining the  nom1al  supply operations  are  encountered.  This 
kvel is  determined to a large extent by  the  overall effici\!ncy of th\!  supplying 
system. 
5.3  "Commercial" (or "discretionarv") stocks are stocks  held  by  the  oil  industry 
above "normal" minimum operating stocks for use in day-to-day activities and for  trading  purposes,  which  can  vary  according  to  market  conditions 
(companies' financial position and stockholding policies, perceptions of  supply 
security, expectations of  price developments, etc.). 
5.4  "Delegated" (or "consigned". or "ticket") stocks are stocks held technically by 
.-an  operator/entity,  in  exchange  of a  certificate  (ticket),  for  the  account  of 
another operator/entity in order for the latter to cover his legal stock obligation, 
or part of it. 
6  For the purposes of this  paper the broad definition  "operating" stocks  defines  those 
stocks  which  are  MOSI1vtOR  (both  technical  and  normal)  and  potentially 
"commercial" stock as described  above.  Every other stock will  be  defined  as "non-
operating", i.e.  held in  excess as a result of legal obligations,  its existence is  dictated 
by  supply  security  considerations  and  is  not  the  result  of decisions  guided  by 
commercial considerations. 
ISSUES ADDRESSED DURING THE CONSULTATIONS 
CARRIED OUT BY THE COM~IISSION 
Oil Supply Group 
7  The Oil  Supply Group (OSG),  a national expert group created by Council  Directive 
73/238/EEC concerning measures in the field of oil  supply security, has reviewed over 
the last two years most of  the issues concerning compulsory security stocks. 
8  Each  Member  State  presented  its  views  on  the  implementation  of  the  different 
provisions of Directive 68/414 (72/425), focusing on  legal, technical or administrative 
problems  and  on  possible  solutions  envisaged.  The  Group  considered  also  the 
consequences of completion of the  internal  market  upon  oil  supply  security,  and  of 
developments in oil markets. 
9  OSG  work  has  established a  better  mutual  understanding  between  Member  States 
themselves  and  between  Member  States  and  the  Commission,  and  has  achieved 
consensus or common ground on how to proceed further in all the issues reviewed. The 
outcome of the review can be summarised as follows: 
9.1  Member States must be able to control the use the stocks in  a supply crisis. It 
is essential. therefore, to possess the legal and administrative powers to control 
compulsory  stocks  and  check  their  levels  and  quality.  Administrative 
supervision  varies  quite  substantially  from  one  Member  State  to  another 
depending  on  the  administrative  structure  set  up  to  supervise,  control  or 
manage security stocks. In general, all Member States possess legal powers to 
proceed to verifications.  However, the means of verification of the quantities 
and quality of stocks, and the sanctions imposed, vary from one l\{ember State 
to another;  several Member States give  priority to spot-checks, others  prefer 
auditing,  fiscal  measures,  statistical  cross-reference  or combinations  of the 
above measures. It is  important that controllers are able, if required, to  verify the physical existence, availability and quality of stocks, as they are reported 
on paper. 
9.2  Evidence  of stocks  at  levels  below  obligation  must  generate  infringement 
procedures which lead to sanctions of  an economic nature against undertakings 
.-which  do  not respect their  obligation.  Penalties  imposed  by Member States 
must be effective, proportional and dissuasive. 
9.3  The OSG felt that administrative  supervision  and  control of stocks  are key 
issues which need to be included in future Community legislation. 
9.4  Government agreements for holding compulsorv oil stocks in other i\lember States 
(Art.  6 of Directive 68/414/EEC) - othenvise called  "bilateral" agreements  - are, 
according to the OSG, a useful means for establishing a legal framework of  storage 
contracts  between  undertakings  of Member States  in  the  internal  market.  Thus, 
there is a minimwn guarantee that, in the case of  supply difficulties, the beneficiary 
i\lember State is  able to request  repatriation of its  stocks  in  order to  draw upon 
them for conswner benefit. Such agreements can also be of  multilateral characte~. 
9.5  Procedures  for  establishing  such  agreements,  however,  can  impose  a  heavy 
administrative  burden  on  Member  States.  The  OSG  has  suggested  that  the 
Commission spell  out  minimum  Community-wide  requirements  \vhich  would 
contribute  to  limiting  the  present  administrative  procedures  and  clarify  or 
strengthen certa.in aspects of  bilateral agreements. 
9.6  Agreements must take into account: 
•  the need ofi\kmber States to retain the right of  decision as to the need, 
feasibility and possibility to store oil in  another Member State and,  if 
so, in what proportion; 
•  the  economic  reality  of the  Community  internal  market,  \\here  the 
movement  of goods  from  one  Member  State  to  another  should  be 
unhindered: 
•  the need for oil companies to operate in a competitive environment. 
9. 7  According to the OSG experts, agreements must include pro\·isions which - in 
addition to those stipulated in Directive 68/414- would defme: 
,  the validity period of an agreement 
a framC\\Ork for '·delegated" stocks: 
•  clauses concerning  repatriation, verification and reporting of rdevant 
stocks: 
•  provisions on control and availability of  stocks. 
9.8  The United Kingdom, one of  the two net oil exporters in the EU, has asked for the 
right of the country to  have  a  higher derogation  from  the  obligation to  maintain 
security  stocks.  A  reduced  obligation  for  a  Mcmb~r SL1te  \\ith  indigenous  oil production  to  hold  security  stocks  is  a  controversial  issue.  Possibilities  and 
conditions which could justify this reduction (15% maximum reduction is allowed 
by Directive 68/414) were discussed in  the OSG, including available spare crude 
oil  production capacity of the two oil  producers mentioned above.  OSG experts 
considered that the issue is of  a political nature and as such, it should be resolved at 
:political level. 
9.9  Directive 68/414/EEC excludes from the (90-day) compulsory stocks certain 
categories of operating stock, or stock which cannot be technically accounted 
(Article 6, § 3). The revie\v of  the relationship bet\veen compulsorv securitv stocks 
and operating stock revealed different approaches to the issue in  Member States. 
The place of  operating stock in total security stocks, in a segregated or co-mingled 
way, is directly or indirectly connected to the availability and accessibility of  stocks 
in  a supply crisis and,  in  certain Member States, is  becoming a "grey" area with 
regard to the internal market and competirion provisions ofthe Treaty. According 
to the OSG experts, a decision to segregate stocks must take into account the 
costs involved for the benefit obtained regarding the stockholding obligation. 
Stocks are held for local  oil  shortages but also for major oil  disruptions  ~d 
each  Member  State  has  designed  its  stockholding  system  according  to  its 
priorities. The essential  is  that a  Member State is  able to  have stocks at the 
disposal of the consumer when needed. 
Certain experts of  the OSG considered that stocks held in the operating system 
of the industry and its distribution channels can be made rapidly available for 
consumption; in addition their maintenance costs are low. Others supported the 
view that a large proportion of  stocks within industry operating systems cannot 
be made available since these stocks are needed for industry operations which 
cease,  or are  "tight'',  if such  stocks  diminish  or  disappear.  The  exclusion 
therefore  of as  much  operating  stock  as  possible  from  compulsory  stocks 
,,·ould  improve  availability  of stocks.  It  would  also  facilitate  their  control 
through spot-checks. These OSG members proposed that non-operating stocks 
are maintained by a non-commercial stockholding entity, or by the Government 
itself. 
An  alternative solution,  proposed by certain experts,  is to specify only those 
stocks in excess of operating stocks, without necessarily calculating operating 
stocks precisely. This specific quantity would not be used by the mmer for his 
O\\TI  operational  purposes  and therefore  it  would  be  always  available  for 
release in an oil supply crisis. 
9. I  0  ll1e  treatment  of international  marine  and  international  m ·1at1on  bunkers  in 
Directive  68/414  is  in  line  \\ith  international  statistical  rules  and  conventions 
(EUROSTAT, IEA and lJN). In  re\iC\\IDg the issue, the large majority of  ~lember 
States  agreed to  maintain the status  quo,  that  is  to  exclude  international marine 
bunkers from the previous year's consumption and to include international aviation 
bunkers  in  the  pre\ious year's consumption.  Two Member Statc:s  indicated that, 
because of  an intense seasonal tourism activity, they normally register a higher level 
of  aviation bunker consumption for which they are obliged to maintain stocks. 
9.11  ~viation kerosene  (jet  fi.1el)  is  a  product of increasing  in1portance  world-v,ide. 
Consumption of  this product has been rapidly increasing in recent years. Currently 
it  is  included in  the  '·middk distillates".  The Commission had asked the  OSG to 
L_j review  the  situation,  in  particular  to  consider  once  more  the  inclusion  of jet 
kerosene  in  a separate category on which  to  impose an obligation 
1
•  Discussions 
concluded that jet kerosene could be reported separately within product category ll 
for reasons of  better statistical information; most Member States considered that an 
imposition of  an obligation on jet kerosene did not seem to be necessary for the time 
'being. 
9.12  Concerning the calculation and  reporting of stocks to the  Commission,  the  OSG 
has suggested simplification of  the second and third methods used to convert crude 
oil to oil product equivalent.  OSG experts did not have major problems to agree 
\\ith the  abo~tion ofthe outdated second method, as proposed by the Commission. 
Certain experts asked for the maintenance of  the third method, favouring stocks in 
the form of finished products. The Commission had suggested to abolish the third 
method as well. 
Contacts with the lndustrv 
10  The  Commission  has  had  regular  consultations  on  stock  issues  with  the  two  main 
industry  associations  operating  at  Community  level:  EUROPIA,  the  "European 
Petroleum lndusti)' Association", representing companies with refining capability, and 
UPEI,  "Union Petroliere  Europeenne  Independante",  representing  operators, traders, 
marketers, importers and distributors without refining capability. 
11  EUROPIA  supports  the  view  that  security  stocks  are  the  responsibility  of 
Society/Government  at  large  and  that  their  cost  should  be  borne  by 
Society/Goverrunent
2
•  EUROPIA does not  support the building of additional  storage 
facilities, but the use of existing ones.  Flexibility is a key issue for the industry which 
should  be taken more  into  consideration  in  revising  Community  legislation.  Bilateral 
agreements  should be encouraged and  applied  in  the  whole of the  Community,  since 
stocks  must be  able to be  maintained anywhere  in  the  internal  market.  Stockholding 
costs must be identified in a transparent manner. 
12  UPEI  supports  strongly  the  segregation  of compulsory  stocks  held  exclusively  for 
security purposes
3
• UPEI strongly supports the establishment of a central entity, body 
or agency  in  each Member  State which would  0'>\n all,  or a large part, of the  stock 
obligation,  be  responsible  for  the  organisation  and  administration  of the  national 
stockholding system of the  ~!ember State concerned and ensure transparency of costs 
and a level playing field for all operators in the market. 
Studv ~'Compulsorv Oil Stocks in the European Union" 
13  A study was commissioned to EMC (Energy Market Consultants, UK) in co-operation 
with  OPAL (Oil  Price Assessments,  UK)  by the  Commission  in  1996/97 in order to 
review  the  01ain  issues  reg~trding  compulsory  stocks  with  respect  to  existing 
Community legislation, pr:1ctices followed by Member States, market changes and the 
1 See also the original proposal of the Commission of 196~: II/COM(64) 406 final of 28.lO.M 
~ EURQPIA's Document ··compulsory Stocks Obligations (CSO} for Oil and Petroleum Products 
Principles". 
3 Memorandum on Stock-holding Issues,  1997 . 
..So consequences ofthe strengthening of  the internal market on stockholding arrangements. 
Areas  needing  clarification,  possible  or  potential  deficiencies,  and  significant 
inconsistencies  which  could  have  a  bearing  on  the  effectiveness  of  drawdown 
capabilities in the event of  a supply emergency were identified and studied. 
14  The study focused on  the comparative analysis of the  different stockholding regimes 
and practices  adopted by and  followed  in  the  15  Member  States,  the  review of the 
minimum operating requirement (MOR), \vith  regard to the availability of stocks and 
the trends in oil consumption and in stockholding arrangements during the period 1970-
1996. 
15  The study confirmed the trend observed since the end of the eighties in the oil  industry 
to cut costs by holding the least possible oil stocks and forecast this trend to continue 
and intensifY in the future. Since 1980, industry stocks in OECD countries have fallen 
by about 25  consumption days. In particular, between 1992 and end-1996 these stocks 
fell by six days. Total company  stock~  (excluding both strategic and entity stocks) in 
Europe have fallen from 68 days total consumption at the end of 1994 to about 64 days 
total  consumption  at the  end  of 1995  and  i.n  1996.  Oil  companies  are  increasingly 
adopting  commercial  attitudes  to  where  and  how  they  do  business.  They are,  thus, 
reluctant to accept that they have a "strategic" responsibility for maintaining the flow 
of oil  to  end-users in  the event of an  international supply disruption.  The cutback in 
company  stocks  has  taken  two  forms:  reductions  in  surplus  capacity  (such  as 
refineries, storage and distributiondepots, etc., thus improving the overall efficiency of 
operations) and cutbacks in "discretionary" stocks. 
16  The apparently changing attitude by Governments towards security stocks is  reflected 
in  the increased willingness to  utilise su-::h  stocks in  '"pre-crisis'' situations.  The IEA 
used part of the security stocks during the Gulf Crisis  in  January  J  991, even though 
there  was  no  recognisable  shortage  of supplies  officially.  Co-ordinated  stockdraw 
before an oil supply crisis, or at an early stage of it,  is  a trend which could become a 
rule in the years to come.  High stock levels are therefore indispensable in  order for a 
country to participate in such a co-ordinated stockdraw. 
17  More particularly, the study identified seven issues: 
17.1  Regarding the uniformitv of stockholding obligations, most Member States do 
not currently differentiate between types of dO\mstream operators in applying 
compulsory  minimum  stockholding  requirements.  Since,  however,  minimum 
operating  stocks  (MOS)  vary  considerably  between  operators  (particularly 
between  refiners  and  distributors),  a  uniform  90  days  minimum  stock 
requirement  appears,  on  the  face  of  it,  to  impose  a  higher  additional 
stockholding requirement on those operators who have a low ··o\m use" stock 
requirement than on those who have a high ''0\m use" requirement. Accon;!ing 
to the study, this issue is likely to be more prominent in the future. 
17.2  Regarding  stocks  held  for  the  account of a  Member State  in  other  I\lember 
States through Government agreements, there is  at present a lack of uniformity 
in  the approach adopted by individual Member States - in  six countries, there 
are no such stocks, while others place limits on volumes held in other Member 
States. According to the study, this issue is likely to becomt! more prominent as 
time  goes  on,  since  some  aspects  of  the  current  restrictions  on  such 
stockholding do not appear to be in line with provisions of  the Treaty regarding the internal market.  It is  important that a consensus is  reached on the regime 
governing  such  agreements,  while  ensuring  that  such  stocks  are  physically 
verifiable. The study proposed the setting up by the Commission of a "clearing 
house" to monitor the  situation  concerning  stocks  held  under  Governmental 
agreements. 
17.3  The study made a distinction amongst minimum operating stocks (MOS) of  the 
industry, between:  "technical" MOS, i.e.  stocks needed in  order for  industry 
facilities  not to  shut do\m,  and  "normal" MOS,  i.e.  stocks  which  could be 
ultimately available in  a crisis after "commercial" stocks have been used up. 
For the whole of the Community, the study estimated "normal'' MOS to lie on 
average in  a  range equivalent to  25-30 days of consumption, but varying by 
country/company. No figure was given for "technical" MOS 'which,  however, 
were estimated to be higher than the  10% "unavailable" stocks defined by the 
lEA. 
17.4  The study found that there is a potential inconsistency in that several Member 
States do not count all  sales of international jet fuel  in  their pre'<ious  year's 
consumption.  Consequently,  it is  desirable to harmonise the method  used for 
the  treatment  of international  aviation  bunkers  according  to  the  approach 
followed  by  the  majority  of Member  States,  namely  the  inclusion  of these 
bunkers in internal consumption. 
17.5  The substantial rise in indigenous oil production in the Community since 1970 
(nO\v  representing 27% of  total Community consumption) gives some grounds 
- according  to  the  study  - for  arguing  that  the  current  15%  maximum 
derogation should be raised for Member States which are self-sufficient, but it 
is difficult to determine a specific new ratio. 
l 7. 6  One more suggestion of the study concerned the  tightening,  in  some Member 
States, of control and supervision of compul'Sory  stocks,  by  introducing - for 
example  - inspection  measures  such  as  more  frequent  spot-checks.  There 
appears  to  be  a  correlation  between  strong  control  and  supervision  and 
satisfactory stock levels;  and poor or weak  control  and  supervision and low 
and  unsatisfactory stock  levels.  Countries  v.ith  less  strict  rules '(often,  also, . 
those with de-centralised systems) tend to have more difficulties  in  respecting 
their stock obligation. MAIN ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION SUPPORTING 
THE SUGGESTED Al\'IENDl\'IENTS TO 
DIRECTIVE 68/414/EEC 
Operating stocks and securitv stockholding arrangements 
In  theory, . compulsory  security  stocks  should  not  be  co-mingled  with  or  contain 
operating stocks (i.e. technical minimum operating stock+ normal minimum operating 
stock+ stocks aimed at commercial operations), since the latter are aimed at working 
and commercial operations. The argument saying that operating stocks can be, at the 
same time, the security buffer needed in an oil supply disruption can raise considerable 
doubt. In an oil supply crisis, not only would the authorities like to obtain this oil for 
the consumers of their country, but also the industry would be inclined to build more 
stocks. Operating stock co-mingled with security stock can potentially weaken security 
of oil supply and jeopardise the efficiency of a stock drawdov.n. There is no guarantee 
that stocks can be made available and at the disposal of  Member State authorities when 
needed in a crisis. 
The lEA addressed the issue once more in  1997 examining the level of "usable" stocks 
in an oil SI.Jpply crisis after excluding M0Rs
4
.  According to the lEA analysis, the bulk 
of stocks  of the  industry  (companies)  is  necessary  for  operating  purposes  and the 
amount of security stocks  available  in  a  crisis  appears to  be  lower than  commonly 
expected,  although  it  cannot  be  measured  \vith  a  high  degree  of precision.  Wide 
disparities,  however,  exist  an1ongst  OECD  countries  reflecting  local  operating 
conditions  and  legislation.  The  lEA  document  concludes  that  all  Government  and 
entity/agency stocks are available with a high degree of  certainty. Oil companies might 
be  reluctant, for commercial reasons, to release even the usable part of their stocks if 
they expected the crisis to deteriorate and oil prices to increase. 
2  Co-mingled stocks for all functions  - \vorking operations and supply security - render 
security storage costs more difficult to identify and therefore less transparent. It is very 
difficult,  sometimes  impossible,  for  refiners  (who generally  hold  large  quantities  of 
such stocks) to distinguish between costs of stocks held exclusively for supply security 
purposes and costs of stocks aimed  at  normal  operations  (working and commercial). 
Therefore it becomes difficult and sometimes impassible to clearly identify the costs of 
security  stocks  and  divide  it  respectively  amongst  the  operators  who  have  the 
obligation to hold such stocks. 
Generally in order to operate commercially in a market, an operator must give evidence 
of stocks maintained directly by himself,  or indirectly tl:trough  delegation of the stock 
obligation to another operator who holds the  stocks for the account of the beneficiary 
operator in  return for ticket certificates proving the existence of such delegated stocks. 
A rental fee is paid in exchange. Non-refiners who have small, or no depots, since their 
operating needs are lovver  (generally  10  to  15  days of "normal" minimum operating 
stock)  than  refiners  (generally  more  than  40  days of "normal" minimum  operating 
stock)  rent  additional  storage  capacity  from  the  latter  paying  a  fee  against  ticket 
certificates. This process, under certain conditions which depend also on the structure 
4 Document IEAJGB(97)52: '·IEA Emergency Reserve Issues" of2 Qecember 1997. 
3:? of each  market,  may  put non-refiners  at a  competitive  disadvantage  since  refinery 
stocks  are  largely  co-mingled  in  the  same  basket.  One  argument  says  that,  under 
cert:1.in  conditions, this fee  could also be considered as  a  partial backing of refinery 
operating stocks by other operators who, normally, are in competition with the refiners 
in the same market. Another argument, however, says that the ticket system described 
above can help  non-refiners  to  cover  the  stockholding  obligation and thus  enter  or 
remain in the market from which they could have been othemise excluded.  It can be 
argued that, generally, in markets favouring co-mingled stocks in which security stocks 
are not clearly identified as they are mixed \\ith stock for operating purposes, problems 
bet\veen refiners and non-refiners are more frequent.  The solution would be,  as stated 
above,  to  identify  and distribute evenly the  stock-holding costs  amongst operators  • 
according to objective criteria-, creating a level playing field which is necessary for the 
proper functioning of  the internal market. 
3  Consultations with the industry have sho\',n that operators \Vith refinery capacity in the 
Community  seem  more  and  more  unhappy  to  assume  the  costs  of a  stockholding 
obligation w·hich  is  larger than  their operating  needs.  They  would  prefer to  see  this 
additional burden transferred to the "Society or Governrnent"
5
.  Since competitiveness 
in global markets is their main objective,  oil  companies tend to lower their operating 
stocks in  order to cut and rationalise costs. They also ask for higher flexibility which 
would allow them to maintain stocks \vherever they can obtain economies of scale in 
the internal market and, thus, be able to reduce costs. These are legitimate requests by 
market operators nowadays  and  a  solution  to  accommodate  them  is  needed  \'vithout 
weakening the supply security of  the Community against oil disruptions. 
4  Mainly for economic reasons. most Member States rotate their stocks allowing, sooner 
or later,  the  use of part of their  compulsory security stock in  trade and commercial 
operations.  The  extent  of  doing  so  depends  on  the  organisational  stockholding 
arrangements in  place. These arrangements are set up  to adapt the characteristics and 
needs of individual Membe.r States, provided that Member State Goverrunents have the 
legal and administrative powers to  put compulsory stocks and stockdraw procedures 
under their control when needed and send the stocks to where they are mostly needed. 
At  all  times  stockholding  mechanisms  must  ensure  that  stocks  are  available  and 
accessible  to  consumers;  that  they  are  maintained  under  transparent  arrangements 
\Vhere the StOckholding COStS are identified and knO\\TI to market operators. 
5  An  appropriate solution for  Member  States and the  industry (both  refiners  and non-
refiners) is  therefore to base stockholding arrangements on a real partnership and co-
operation through  transparent and efficient  mechanisms  ensuring that all  stocks  are 
really at the disposal ofthe Governments in the event of supply difficulties. At all other 
times,  a  regular  control  of stocks  can  ensure  their  availability  and  accessibility. 
Transparency \Vould  imply that, as  a first step,  security stockholding cost is  identified 
in each Member State where this has not yet been the case. 
6  Experience to date shows that, in general, the above conditions can b.;:  more easily met 
in  countries having set up  stockholding  bodies of the  agency/entity type to  hold and 
O\\TI  all,  or  a  large  part,  of the  stock  obligation.  It  has  been  perceived  that when 
Member States set up  such an entity to O\m a significant part of the stock obligation, 
the total number of stocks expressed in days has increased. This is  partially due to the 
fact  that  oil  companies  continue  to  hold  operating  stocks  for  their. O\\TI  needs.  In 
5 EUROPIA's Document mentioned in an earlier chapter. addition to  those stocks,  entity  stocks  increase  the  total  stock  quantities,  enhancing 
supply security. Stockholding entities are usually non-profit organisations and maintain 
generally most of  their stocks outside the operating/commercial cycle. It is evident that 
the need to refresh oil products does not exclude that non-operating stocks would have 
to be renewed through the processing facilities used normally for operating stocks. 
Administrative Supervision and Control 
7  Administrative  supervision  and  control  are  issues  closely  linked  to  the  relationship 
bet\veen operating and security stocks.  Since Directive 68/414/EEC puts compulsory 
stocks at full  Member State disposal  in  an  oil  supply emergency, national legislation 
must allow Member State Governments  to  put stocks  under their control  in  such  a 
case.  A  number of Member States  have the  power to  proceed  to  the  requisition of 
stocks as  a  last resort.  Other Member States do  not  possess such powers  and base 
control  of  stocks  and  stockdraw  procedures  on  the  voluntary  co-operation  of 
Government with companies, operators, agencies or other entities, which are the actual 
stockholders. 
It is important to achieve comparable levels of administrative supervision and control 
of stocks in  all Member States and thus ensure that stocks are really available te the 
consumer at all times.  The latter is  particularly important in  cases where a  Member 
State holds  part of its  stock obligation  in  other Member States and  when stocks are 
"delegated'' to other operators.  -
8  A regular verification of stock quantities  and quality can guarantee disposability and 
control  of  stocks  in  oil  supply  disruptions.  For  various  reasons  (technical, 
administrative  or economic)  it  is  not  always  easy  for  the  authorities  to  proceed  to 
regular verifications of stocks  and  it is  even  more difficult to proceed to on-the-spot 
inspections. In  addition there  is  no  legal  basis at Community level  concerning control 
of stocks.  It is  necessary therefore to  introduce an Article  in  the  revised  Community 
legislation,  explicitly  referring  to  control  of stocks  and  sanctions  for  those  not 
respecting their obligation. 
Centralised I De-centralised Stockholding Systems 
9  Compulsory security stocks are held  in  Memba States in  many different \vays and in 
particular by: 
•  companies,  refiners,  operators,  traders.  marketers  and  other  profit-making 
undertakings; (de-centralised systems) 
•  the Government; (centralised systems) 
•  joint  agencies  or  similar  entities  established  for  this  purpose;  (centralised 
systems). 
It  is  essential  that  Member  States,  in  implementing  their  compulsory  stockholding 
arrangements, respect certain basic stockholding criteria. The best way to do so is  to 
set  up  mechanisms  ensunng  a  partnership  between  the  public  authorities  and  the 
3S private industry. The more favourable conditions foi such a partnership are created in 
stockholding regimes of mixed character, i.e.  with combined stockholding systems of 
centralised and de-centralised character. Some of the advantages and disadvantages of 
the different systems existing today are outlined below. 
Stocks held exclusivelv bv the Government 
10  Advantages: 
•  stocks under immediate Mqmber State control; 
•  stocks segregated and held apart from operating systems; 
•  location,  quality  and  quantity  of  stocks  easy  to  identify/verify  through 
inspection at any moment; 
•  stockdraw is  l 00% controlled by Government. 
11  Disadvantages: 
•  costs assumed exclusively by the public budget; 
•  potential problems of  excessive bureaucracy; 
•  potential lack of  technical expertise: 
•  understanding of (rapid) market changes potentially questionabl-e; 
•  stocks held outside nonnal distribution channels or not linked with the latter; 
•  product specifications difficult to meet; 
•  stockdrav·•  possible for  public  revenue  purposes,  even  outside  an  oil  supply 
crisis. 
Stocks held exclusivelv bv the Jndustrv 
12  Advantages: 
•  stocks more in tune with operational needs of  the market; 
•  more efficient and less costly organisation of  stocks; 
•  easier to maintain the right product specifications; 
•  stocks in or near distribution channels. 
13  Disadvantages: •  availability and existence of  stocks difficult to guarantee, ensure or verify; 
•  quality of  stocks difficult to guarantee, ensure or verify; 
•  inspections  on-the-spot are difficult,  in  particular in  the case of co-mingled 
:stocks; 
•  danger of  discrimination against non-refiners, particularly those \\ith limited or 
non-existent storage facilities; 
•  risk of unfair cost sharing benveen market operators; 
•  stockdraw difficult to initiate and control by the Government; 
•  danger of high numbers of delegated stocks, which are difficult or impossible 
to  identify  and  their  availability  in  a  supply  crisis  is  neither  sure,  nor 
guaranteed. 
Stocks held bv an EntitvAgencv 
14  Advantages: 
•  location, quality and quantity of  stocks can be easily identified; 
•  availability of  stocks can be easily verified through spot-check inspections; 
•  stockdraw initiated, controlled and implemented under the auspices and control 
of the  Government  \\ith  the  collaboration  and  partnership  of the  operating 
compames; 
•  potential discrimination against smaller operators can be more easily avoided; 
•  costs  and  financing  arrangements  are  transparent  (fee  or levy  is  knO\m  in 
advance to operators); 
•  easy to ensure equitable allocation of  costs; 
•  difficulties  encountered  in  implementing  bilateral  stockholding  arrangements 
can be overcome more effectively; 
•  future changes in regulations can be more effectively applied. 
15  Disadvantages: 
•  danger of  bureaucracy in operations, unless structure remains small; 
•  potential  lack  of  technical  expertise,  unless 
1 experts  from  the  industry 
participate in the structure; •  danger of stocks not adequately linked to existing supplying structures, unless 
partnership with the industry exists; 
•  administrative and operating costs of Agencies high, especially when initiating 
operations (purchase of  oil, new tankage, etc.), 
The latter,  however,  can be  partially offset through  cost cover  by  bank  loans  of a 
mortgage type, the payment of which  is  normally covered by  a  special  fee,  or levy, 
passed on to the entity members. 
Financing 
16  The financing of the compulsory stocks is  borne by the end consumer and included in 
the final  product price of the products concerned. This principle is  based on the fact 
that the end consumer is the beneficiary of these stocks in  a supply crisis. Depending 
on the  stockholding  arrangements  adopted,  financing  of compulsory stocks  is  either 
included in the final  product price directly by the oil  company, or included in a fee·or 
levy, easily identified. 
Reporting and stock calculations 
17  Reporting  of compulsory  stocks  is  made  through  a  statistical  table  summary  sent 
regularly  by  the  Member  State  authorities  to  the  Commission.  Directive  68/414 
explicitly stipulates technical details for calculating and reporting stocks for each of  the 
three product categories. 
18  Statistical data show that,  on  the  one  hand, consumption has  been  falling  for  certain 
products in the Community in  recent years - notably in  category III  products.  On the 
other hand,  consumption  has  been  increasing  for  other  products,  notably  gasolines, 
diesel fuel and jet kerosene, reflecting changes iro the market in  recent years. In addition 
other products have gro""n in  importance (LPG, naphtha) and their consumption \viii 
be important in the future
6
. 
19  The different approaches adopted in several Member States create inconsistency which 
renders  statistical comparison more  difficult.  The  importance of valid  stock data is 
evident and steps to improve them are necessary. These steps aim to: 
•  obtain  more  uniform  and  consistent  information  from  !\!ember  States  and 
achieve, therefore, higher comparability in data reporting: 
•  underline  the  importance  of  certain  oil  products  \vith  forecast  high 
consumption for the  future:  the  three  categories  of oil  products of Directive 
68/414 reflected the need of the market at that period of  time. 
6 ·'Compulsory Oil Stocks in the European Union". main report. pp:.t-5  to 51. 20  The following lines are therefore suggested: 
•  To  leave  Directive  68/414  as  it  stands  and  exclude  international  marine 
bunkers  ("for sea-going vessels") from the calculation of consumption of all 
:Member States. 
•  To  explicitly  mention  in  Directive  68/414  today's  practice
7  and  ·include 
bunkers  for  international  aviation  in  internal  consumption  of all  Member 
States. 
•  To show the quantity (and corresponding days) of  jet fuel  kerosene separately 
within category II, without imposing an obligation. 
•  To abolish method II for conversion of  crude oil into products. 
•  To  change  the  annual  consumption  (upon  which  the  level  of  stocks  is 
calculated) on  a specific date every year - for instance at the end of March -
for all Member States. 
•  To calculate consumption on  the basis of the previous year in  a uniform way 
in all Member States. 
•  To send to  the  Commission,  within a  shorter period,  the  surr.mary  v,ith  the 
statistical data of Member States at the end of  each month. 
•  To always use the same reporting form which may be updated. 
•  To monitor market developments, in  particular the consumption of  the different 
oil  products  in  Europe  and  world-wide,  in  order  to  test  the  coverage  of the 
product categories as stipulated in the Council Directive. 
Indigenous Oil Production 
21  The  implications  of a  percentage  reduction  in  the  stockholding  obligation  of an 
oil-producer Member State are not always  eas~: to  identify.  Both  OSG experts and a 
recent study on  compulsory stocks have given  certain parameters which may  lead  to 
solutions. 
22  For the sake of  consistency, and as already stipulated in Directive 68/414 and followed 
by a vast majority of l\Iember States, it is  appropriate that the reduction percentage is 
calculated on the basis of  internal consumption as expressed in tonnes and not in days. 
23  In  the  1968 proposal no  technical  analysis supported the  15% maximum derogation. 
Therefore, since technical backing is not likely to be sufficient for the establishment of 
a  new  derogation  percentage,  the  issue  may  be  better  resolved  at a  political  level. 
Consideration can be also given to  the fact that indigenous  oil  production of the two 
main Community producers, UK and Denmark. corresponds to 25% of  the total EU-15 
7 Practice followed by the Statistical Office of the European Community and the OECDIIEA. oil  consumption  of the  last  three  years.  Total  EU-15  indigenous  oil  production 
corresponds to 27% of  total EU oil consumption. 
BASIC STOCKHOLDING CRITERIA 
24  Efficiency, transparency and consistency as  far as security stockholding mechanisms 
are concerned can be  enhanced  in  Member  States  through  compliance  with  certain 
basic stockholding criteria. 
25  Compulsory oil stocks in the 'community must at all times be at the level of 90 days' 
average daily internal consumption based on the preceding year for each of the three 
categories  of petroleum  products.  These  stocks  must  be  in  line  ·with  the  following 
criteria: 
•  to be fully at the disposal of Member States for use should difficulties arise in 
obtaining oil supplies; 
•  to be available and accessible for consumption; 
•  to be maintained in such a way so that they can be  identified, accounted and 
controlled at all times, on a continuous basis; 
•  to allow for an identification of their costs in  a transparent way in the final 
product price of  the oil products concerned; 
•  to be fully in line with the principle of a level playing field bet\veen all market 
operators as resulting from the rules of  the Treaty; 
•  to take into a~count the free movement of  goods as a reality of  the frontierless 
Internal Market. TABLES &  GRAPHS ...{:' 
IV 
I· 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
>:. 
Finland 
France. 
Germany 
'  ~ '  . 
·i .· 
Greece 
:·:::i. 
Ireland·· 
Italy  <;. ;: 
~  ;,;~~:;;~_:'J~> 
.LUL 
L.::~L  ;,., 
Netb.:>+.::c. · 
:;,:~·:.:;.:~~:<~~;;  ;~; 
Portugal 
·, 
'· 
Spain:,. 
. Sweden 
.  '  ~ :  . ~ 
:~~·:h:•  ;:. 
~. :  •  ~ .  • ! .  ~ ;  ; 
Structure 
·,: 
Cent. (ELO) 
De-cent. 
Cent. (FDO) 
Cent. (NESJ\) 
Ceni.(CPSSP/ 
S/\GESS) 
l'.:nL (EIIV + 
gov. strategic) 
De-c.:nt. 
Cent. (NOR/\) 
De-cent. 
(prop. for Cent.) 
De-cent. 
Cent. (COVJ\) 
l>c-ccnt. 
Cent. (CORES) 
De-cent (NIJTEK 
responsible) 
De-Cent. 
NA- not applicable 
Summary of Compulsory Stockholding Legislation/Systems in the Community 
Ownership 
Companies 
NJ\ 
Comp<mics 
llovemment 
lio\•t./Comps. 
Cnt poration under 
puhlic law 
NA 
Government 
NJ\ 
NA 
Govt.-controlled 
foundation 
NA 
Public 
Corporation 
NJ\ 
(govt. aulhnrily) 
Nl\ 
Agency 
Share 
300,000 tons 
(14 days, 15%) 
NJ\ 
62 days (80%) 
(1.3 m tons) 
I million tons 
(50 days, 55%) 
54%(51 days) 
(9 million tons) 
XO days (  X·I'Y..) 
(2 1.6 m tons) 
NA 
70 days (7K%) 
(270,000 tons) 
NJ\ 
NJ\ 
3 million tons 
(82 days, 79%) 
N/\ 
3  :l days ( 37'Yu, 
J million tons) 
NA 
NA 
. Companies 
Covered 
Importers 
Rdincrs + 
Importers 
Producers+ 
Refiners + Imps. 
Importers 
lm porters 
l{eliners + 
Products Imps. 
Product Mktrs. + 
Importers 
hnpm1ers + 
f .arge Consumers 
Electric Utilities, 
Rcliners, Mktrs. 
Importers 
Retiners + 
Importers 
Importers 
Marketers+ 
l.arge Consumers 
Reliners + Imps. 
+ Consumers 
Rcliners + 
Marketers 
Number of 
Companies< 
all importers 
(main comps =  6) 
c60 
c35 
4 
ciOO 
.:120 
c25 
c25 
c 150 
17 
·to 
ciS 
c30 
~,;<)() 
c50 
table 1 
·Specific for .. 
ne~  entl'ants, 
Yes 
(3 months) 
No 
No 
Yes (50% of 
obligation) 
No 
No 
Yes 
{J months) 
No 
Yes (25% 
of  imports) 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
.  ·.1  .  I  ......  ,  ....... , ...  ,  .......... .  ·.Minimum  .···  Miidmum  .. ,  · Prodiietf'i>  .·.·. ;ZCou ::::,;> 
Voh/Stocks  ·  _'obUgatio~), ).\  co~~~J';il~ ~~~[.1\~~~y~Ti;\i( 
,  '·'··"·'·'·  .1; ••  _,,,  1  -,  ·  -.,  "·" ., L~"·~ ~ipi •.  L.,.>:  .,~-){,< ....  _.,  ~-···  .} 
No  I  27.5%  I  EU 3  I  Fee (ELG) 
No (6-7,000 tons 
stock until 3/97) 
No 
Yes (vols of 
5~2o,ooo t pa) 
Yes {capacity 
400-I,OOOmJ) 
No 
No? (tankage 
in country) 
No 
No 
No 
Yes (vols of 
500 litn!s) 
No 
No 
Yes (vols of 
50,000 m3pa) 
Yes (vols of 
50,000 tons pa) 
(100 days) 
25%. 
(91 days) 
90 days 
3 months 
(ie 91  days) 
26% 
(91  days)) 
95 dqys 
90 days 
90 days 
90 days 
90 days 
90 days+ 
120 days 
(90 days jet) 
90 days 
25% 
(91  days) 
76.5 days 
(ic 15% otTsct) 
EU-3 
EU 3 
EU 3+cmde 
EU 3+jet 
EU 3 
EU3 
EU3 
EU 3 
EU 3 
EU3 
EU 3 +jet 
EU 3 
EU 3+LPG 
EU 3 
None (price 
allowance) 
Fee(FDO, 
but zero now) 
Levy 
Fee(CPSSP) 
Fee (EBV) 
None 
Levy 
None 
None (price 
allowance) 
Levy 
No 
Fee (CORES) 
None 
None --F 
(.rJ 
I 
' 
! 
Austria 
Belgium·.· 
. ; 
,•  Denmark 
Finlan4 .. 
"  ... 
France  .... 
Germany 
i. Greece·:. 
,·· 
Ireland. 
Italy..  .  .. 
. ·.·.···  (  ·< ,,.. 
LuL  •·.,.•  ,;•·· 
'  <':' 
,. 
' 
·Neth.·, 
' 
Portugal; 
Spain•· 
Sweden  .. 
UK .. 
Date effective  Coverage 
1st April  Calc.:ndar 
1st April  Calendar 
1st July  Calendar 
.1st July  Cakndar 
!{oiling  12.-lllllfllh 
1st April  Calendar 
lsi April  Calendar 
lsi July  Calendar 
1st April/May  Calendar 
I st Jan  Calendar 
lsi April  Calendar 
Rolling  12-month 
Rolling  12-month 
I st July  Calendar 
lsi July  Calendar 
Cornp:u·ison of Compulsor)· Stocl{-llflldinJ! Pntcticcs in the Cormnunit:y 
Full Jet Fuel  Derogation  Allocation  Location  .·.Bilateral  . Percentage  Spot-checks'  .. Penalties 
Coverage  for Output  of  Crude  Requirements  , Agreement~  Abroad,< 
·.  ··•·· 
i;:j;;  ·.  ' 
.  '  ,;'  . ', .. ·:·  '  ", 
No (not lor  10%  1st option  No  No  zero  Yes  Yes 
min. stocks)  ( <20%) 
No  None  I st option  No  Yes (<30%  20%  Yes  No 
abroad) 
Yes  15%  3nl option  No  Yes  1%  No  Yes 
(maximum) 
No  None  lsi option  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  I 
I 
I 
Yes  ]'!-';,  lsi option  Y  cs (CI'SSI'  Yes (<10'%  2%·  Yes  Yes 
by region)  ahroad) 
Yes  3%  lsi option  Yes (15 days  Yes  6%  Yes  Yes 
Env  by region) 
Yes  3%  lsi option  No  No  zero  Yes  Yes 
Yes  None  2Ikl option  No  Yes  30%  Yes  Yes 
Y  cs? (some  6%.  1st option  Yes (stocks  Yes (<10%  I%  Yes  Yes  I 
~  I 
not counted?)  set by site)  abroad)  I 
No? (plans  None  no cmde  No  Yes {<50%  50%  Yes  Yes? 
to include)  abroad) 
Yes  14'%  lsi option  No  Yes(COVA)  20%  Yes  Yes 
Yes  None  2nd option  No  No  zero  Yes  Yes? 
Yes  I  •v.,  3rd option  Y  .:s (part  No  z.:ro  Yes  Yes 
ncar consumers) 
Yes  None  3rd option  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Yes  15%  2nd option  No  Yes (<30%  II%  No  Yes 
(maximum)  abroad) 
table 2 COMJ•AIUSON OF STOCKJIOLI>ING llOUIES I ENTITIES IN TilE COMMUNITY 
- -------
Entity/  Agency  Management  Stock Volumrs  Share of Total  Crude/Product$  ::~r~~~;L:;  Control  OWlled!Helc~  Compulsory  • .·.  Composition  ........  ·•·  ··•········ 
......  ·.:::·::-:;>:-··, 
Austria  ELG  OMV plus 5 other major companies  0.3 million tons  14% (13  days)  All crude  6.5 ECU/m3 
(reports to Ministry of Economic Affairs)  .,  ELG storage fee 
Belgium  None 
Denmark  FDO  Representatives from 5 major companies, also from other  1.3 million tons  80% (62 days)  8% crude  None 
smaller companies, plus one govcrnmcnt rep.  from DEA  (suspended) 
Finland  NESA  Ministry of  1.0 million tons  55% (50 days)  30% crude  6.9 ECU/m3 
Trade &  Industry  Levy on sales 
Franct- CPSSP/SAGESS  CPSSP- 9 oil industry representatives, 2 independent experts, 2 gov reps  (5 mill tons MAD)  30% (29 days)  All products  3.9 ECU/m3, 
SAGESS - reps frurn  7 refining companies and 4 non-refiners, plus 3 gov rep  3.  9 million tons  24% (23 days)  All products  CPSSP full fee 
$ 
Germany  EBV  3 government representatives, 3 reps from relining industry and  21.6 million tons  84% (80 days)  31% crude  4.5 ECU/m3 
I 
3 reps from  importing/trading companies  product equivalent  Fee to EBV  ~ 
(;reece  None 
lrt•land  NORA  Suhsidiary of IN PC on armslength basis currently,  0.3 million tons  78% (70 days)  76% crude  5.1  ECU/m3. 
one of 4 Directors is government representative  Levy on sales 
Italy  None 
(Proposed) 
Lux.  None 
Net h.  COVA  5-9 board mcmhcrs, appointed hy Minister of  2.9 million tons  All eflcctively,  51% crude  5.1 ECU/m3 
Economic Affairs and Minister of Finance  as lEA minimum  Levy on sales  ~ 
t•ortugal  None  I 
I 
I 
Spain  CORES  Chairm:utand 2 Directors appointed hy Ministry of Industry &  Energy,  3.0 million tuns  33% (30 days)  All products  5.8 ECU/m3 
plus 3 representatives from'rcliners and 2 reps from  non-refiners  Full CORES fee 
Sweden  None 
...... 
UK 
••••••••• 
None 
·.···  ·.  ·.· 
table 3 ~ 
~ 
Position: 02/98 
Oil stocks - Bilateral Agreements concluded between the Member States of  the European Union 
EUR-15  BE  OK  DE  El  ES  FR  IRL  IT  LUX  NL  PO  • UK.  ··.OS  ·· 
Belgique/Belgi!  1  1  1  1  1  3&4 
Oanmark  1  3  3&4 
Deutschland  1  3  1  2 Lux  1 
Elias 
Espana 
France  1  3  21rl  2 Lux  4  3&4 
Ireland  1  1  21rl  3&4  1 
tlalia  1  4 
Luxembourg  1  2  Lux  2 Lux  1 
Nederland  1  3  1  4  3&4  4  1  3&4 
Portugal 
United Kingdom  3&4  3&4  3&4  1  3&4 
Osterreich 
Sverige  1  4 
~omi/Finland 
N.B. : This table can be read either way. 
Caption 
I.  Reciprocal agreement pur.;uant to Article 6 of the Council Directive 68/414/EEC 
2.  Asymmetrical agreement with indication of the beneficiary  country of the stocks  established on the territory of another Member State pursuant to Article 6 of the Counc~  Directive 68/414/EEC. 
3.  Informal short term ad hoc  arrangement; (genUeman's agreements). 
4.  Recrprocal agreement  under consideration or in the process of being agreed. 
table 4 
'  sv  ;;)  l'i~  :sF· .. 
1 
4 
1 
1 --(::'  r-..--
MONTHLY REPORT ON OIL STOCKS CONFORMING TO ARTICLE 4 OF COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 68/414/EEC OF 20.12.1968 
Country:  FINAL 
Reporting date:  '000 tonnes 
Col1  Col2  Col3  Col4  Col 5=Col 2+3  Col6  Col 7=Coi5/Col 6 
CONTRIBUTION  BILATERAL STOCKS 
FROM CRUDE OIL  HELD IN OTHER  STOCK POSITION IN 
STOCKS OF CRUDE  AND  STOCKS Of'  MEMOt-R STATES  AVERAGE DAILY  NUMBER OF DAYS OF 
OIL & FEEDSTOCKS  FEEDSTOCKS  FINISHED  FOR YOUR OWN  TOTAL OF FINISHED  CONSUMPTION  OF  PREVIOUS YEAR'S 
JATEGORIE  PRODUCTS  (X)  (XX)  PRODUCTS (A)  ACCOUNT(B)  PRODUCTS  PREVIOUS YEAR  CONSUMPTION 
CRUDE OIL& 
FEEDSTOCKS  \  ------ -------------------- --------- ------------------ ----------------------
____________ , 
MOTOR 
GASOLINE& 
I.  AVIATION FUELS f.-----------·  1---------- ----------· ------------ ------ --------- --------- -------- ----------
KEROSENE AND 
KEROSENE TYPE 
FUELS  f.----------- ____________ , 
--------- --------- -------- --------- ---------- ---------- . II  . 
GAS/DIESEL 
OILS  ------ -------------------- ------------------ --------- ---------- ----------
____________ , 
Ill.  FUEL OILS 
TOIAL 
(X) The stocks of crude oil and feedslocks held 1n other Member Slates for your own account ha11e to be included. The stocks of crude oil and feedstocks held in your country for the benefit of other Member States hll\le to be excluded. 
(XX) Indicate which of the three f&mutae mentioned in article 5 of the Council Direclille has been chosen to con11ert crude oU and feedstockS into petroleum product equillalents: FORMULA Nr  .... 
(A) The stockS of finished products held in other Member States for your own account ha11e to be included. The stockS or finished products held in your country for the benefit of other Member States ha11e to be excluded. 
(B) Figures reported are already included in columns 1 and 3. 
table 5 STOCKS HELD UNDER BILATERAL AGREEMENTS 
(form used by Member States conforming to Directive 68/414/EEC) 
Country:  Reporting date: 
A) STOCKS HELD ON NATIONAL TERRITORY F,OR THE BENEFIT OF ANOTHER COUNTRY 
'000 Tonnes 
Category I  Category II  Category Ill 
Crude and  Motor Spirit and 
Beneficiary country  Feedstocks  Aviation Fuels  Kerosene  Gas/Diesel Oil  Fuel Oils 
TOTAL 
B) STOCKS ABROAD CREDITED TO NATIONAL OBLIGATION 
'000 Tonnes 
Category I  Category II  Category Ill 
Crude and  Motor Spirit and 
Crediting Country  Feedstocks  Aviation Fuels  Kerosene  Gas/Diesel Oil  Fuel Oils 
TOTAL 
table Sa ~ 
C1't 
'J'(>TALJ~U:IS  __  _j_~  __  __j  -----+--~----- -[ ---- -- l--- ---~c:=  ----·-
-- ______ _] _ _j  _________ j ________ ------ -------------------- =~==~=~-j--- +- j----j~()urcc::~f,_l~a~~~~j'~CIIEN•~tnal  data I  I  1 
__  ___  T!'_en<!_s_il!_~~i!_~h!<~'.'i-~in•:!t•~il_lg ~~~~enuJI_,I~~~Ir.l~~c__s,~ockslL!~e_l~~~~_!!~~t_l_territo  1 
~  1  .~  ~  ~- ~~~---~9112  19113  1984~--____:  .1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
Stock~'~-l~m~_avc:~~gc_l~v~l~~lY.Y.""f!lPIIrlly_c:sti_Jnatcdhy 15~~C2_  ________ --------_____ ------r--· 
Crude.~tj-==62,.fC~ 63I  c~-?3.6_1  ·_ ·=x3§  68.5 I  60.6  58.4 I  53.6  ------- -----,--------~-----·--~-----j-------~---z-1  1  I  I  I  I 
__  c_5!:~- ___  5~._0 ___  5?_,:3__ --~}  _61}~- _58~13_t_5_8:L_ __  5p~!:) 1  ::.: 1  --
~HK  I  oi.6  56.3 
I 
Ill  I  I  ''1.1  19.9 
..  _  ....  I  ...... 8  34.8 
---------------------- ;::------- ------r----- I  I 
Motor Ga  .9  15.9  16.3  17.4  17.2  18.0  18.1  19.1  19.6  19.7  :::.::  :::  ------ ------------- .-r----::: 
Gasldiese  .4  30.3  31.9  32.6  33.1  32.4  33.2  34.6  36.0  35.2  ::.:  :: 
·.r1. -_,  I  14.31  22.2  -. .. n;  .  ...-.7,  90.7 
152.7 .··  __  ---15(3  •.  147.0 
Residual- 7.8  25.6  25.4  21.0  26.2  24.6  26.5  25.9  24.6  2s.1  ::.:  ::  ------ - r----
Total Pro  __  ..:!_  86.3  88.4  91.3  90.1  88.4  91.7  93.0  93.9  93.7 
1 
::.: 
1 
:: 
Total Sloe  164.9  170.1  195.3  188.9  172.2  158.3  151.8  139.9  145.5  150.3  147.4  146.7  152.7  151.6  152.6  153.6 
'':~~J>:w"''i!~~;!oi~  !,~~~.;j.;~;p;~~J=~~iJ.~:,~~~•~:I~)  =--~~~ :=~-- ~ =  ~  --~~==  ~~c-~  I  :  :  :  I 
Crude, etc  34  39  42  42  39  39  36  39  39  37  37  39  37  .36  ::::  ::: .  -- ---[- -----------··-- --·---- ---------·------- ----·  .  ------------------------------ --------t-·--·:._ ___ -1---C  ~  I  I 
~~~~i?;~o~~«: _  __:  =~~-~; ·  -~~--:--=:~~ =- ~} --~~~----;~~ :-:==~r :  -~  -- ~f - -- =-!r ==  :r :-==:· ~~  ~~- --~g- --~~----~  ~-~  " I  :.: I 
..  --. --------- --------.----.  ------...  ----------· ..  ----------- -------- .  - ----·--- -- ------------:-----·· -- ------- ----------- ----
R~sidual Fuel Oil  ~  ---~Q__  _E)~-- ___  66  _ --~~- _____  7Q ____  ?§.. ___  7~  ---~()  ___  §__!_  --~I-1---~~-~?- 76 I  .  ~ I  . =+-
Total Products  57  64  66  64  63  63  58  60  60  59  57  58  58  57  -- --
----~  --- ------·-- -- ---
Total Days  91.1  106.4  102.5  93.4  93.9  97.2  102.4  108.4  102.2  98.6  98.4  96.2 
·- .  ·- .  35  33 
I  I 
c;o  I  #:1  I  62  61 
~I 
O..J  I  62  57 
7fl  7<: I  80  73 
00  I  ::u J  58  54 
.I 
92:2  92.4  . 92.6  86.8  95.2  93.0 
-±  ---
%of  total stocks 
i------1  !-------+  i----4-----+- I 
-------------1---------~==-1-==-~==!=--=~~~t=--=-=t=-=j--1  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
.~ 1~~  ~~~-:;~=~tl~f=~~  ~~t~~:~i~}~~t~t~~[~t!~  ~~  ~~~  ~:~ 1 
1--------1------1---- ---l -----------1- ------·----- --- -- ----· ------- ------1----l-----1--·-1  I 
table 6 TOTAL EU-15  Source: EC/ lEA 
Oil Products Consumption Trends 
000 tons  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995 
Motor Gasoline  70088  85102  100010  101045  118044  118250 
Road Diesel  29516  36008  50718  60818  86748  108512 
OtherGDO  137482  147535  143289  120816  103871  101435 
Total GOO  166998  183543  194007  181634  190619  209947 
Jet Fuel  12094  16869  17851  19327  26367  31927 
Kerosene  8126  6825  4167  3628  3746  4477 
Total Middle Distillates  187218  207237  216025  204589  ~20732  246351 
Residual Fuel Oil  212073  212020  199349  104679  89481  88550 
Total EU 3 Categories  469379  504359  515384  410313  428257  453151 
TOTAL INLAND  580400  611900  .  623599  520269  549523  586430 
Gas/Diesel Oil Bunkers  6572  6116  6263  6943  7765  8383 
Resid Fuel Oil Bunkers  30381  30968  24846  20564  27018  27007 
Total Bunkers  36953  37084  31109  27507  34783  35390 
Indigenous Oil Output  17007  16205  95893  150607  118449  157730 
Output as % of inland  2.9%  2.6%  15.4%  28.9%  21.6%  26.9% 
Share of middle distillates 
Diesel  15.8%  17.4%  23.5%  29.7%  39.3%'  44.0% 
Other GDO  73.4%  71.2%  66.3%  59.1%  47.1%  41.2% 
Jet Fuel  6.5%  8.1%  8.3%  9.4%  11.9%  13.0% 
Kerosene  4.3%  3.3%  1.9%  1.8%  1.7%  1.8% 
Cat I as % of EU 3 Cats  14.9%  16.9%  19.4%  24.6%  27.6%  26.1% 
Cat II as % of EU 3 Cats  39.9%  41.1%  41.9%  49.9%  51.5%  54.4% 
Cat Ill % of EU 3 Cats  45.2%  42.0%  38.7%  25.5%  20.9%  19.5% 
EU 3 Cats as % of total  80.9%  82.4%  82.6%  . 78.9%  77.9%  77.3% 
Bunkers as % of total  6.4%  6.1%  5.0%  5.3%  6.3%  6.0% 
Mogas % annual growth-rate  4.0  3.3  0.2  3.2  0.0 
Diesel % annual growth-rate  4.1  7.1  3.7  7.4  4.6 
Other GDO % annual growth-rate  1.4  -0.6  -3.4  -3.0  -0.5 
Total GDO % annual growth-rate  1.9  1.1  -1.3  1.0  2.0 
Jet fuel o/o  annual growth-rate  6.9  1.1  1.6  6.4  3.9 
Kerosene o/o  annual growth-rate  -3.4  -9.4  -2.7  0.6  3.6 
Mid dists % annual growth-rate  2.1  0.8  -1.1  1.5  2.2 
Resid fuel % annual growth-rate  0.0  -1.2  -12.1  -3.1  -0.2 
EU 3 Cats % annual growth-rate  1.4  0.4  -4.5  0.9  1.1 
Inland % annual growth-rate  1.1  0.4  -3.6  1.1  1.3 
Bunkers o/o  annual growth-rate  0.1  -3.5  -2.4  4.8  0.3 
table 7 
'f5 Belgique!Belgi~ 
Denmark 
Deutschland 
Elias 
Espaila 
France 
Ireland 
!tali  a 
Luxembourg 
Nederland 
Portugal (.'C) 
United Kingdom • 
Osterreich 
Sverige 
Suomi/Finland 
EUR-15 
EUR 15-OIL STOCK SITUATION 
at: 1/10/1997 
99  70S  91  2661 
114  513  112  1317 
123  9868  110  20699 
92  729  82  1509 
lOS  2600  91  5562 
103  4499  108  12102 
91  273  87  717 
78  3763  87  6151 
89  124  82  261 
176  2033  215  4287 
112  596  100  1087 
. 78  4807  59  5367 
138  688  95  1231 
95  1095  122  2094 
125  631  124  1393 
106  32924  102  66438 
(.'C) At :1.9.1997 
• Obligation of  M.S.: 90 days. (U.K.: -15%). 
CATEGORY  I  -1-.lotor spirit  and aviation fu~l of  gasolin~  t)-p~. 
CATEGORY  11  - Gasoil, diesel oil, keros~n~ and jet-fuel. 
CATEGORY Ill  ·Fuel oils. 
table 8 
163 
S4S 
186 
107 
182 
149 
185 
89 
76 
5213 
131 
217 
251 
314 
193 
165 
857 
1172 
3449 
802 
3019 
1764 
634 
6526 
17 
2033 
1047 
3542 
1002 
2535 
917 
29316 
101 
163 
119 
90 
109 
110 
111 
86 
83 
262 
113 
81 
133 
. 156 
140 
113 
1000 t 
4223 
3002 
34016 
3040 
11181 
18365 
1624 
16440 
402 
8353 
2730 
13716 
2921 
5724 
2941 
128678 European Union:  Indigenous Oil Output 1995 
Million Tons  Source: ECIIEA 
Austria  1.1  11.4  9.7% 
Belgium  20.2 
Denmark  9.2  9.4  97.7% 
Finland  10.0 
France  2.9  89.7  3.3% 
Germany  3.9  136.4  2.9% 
Greece  0.5  13.8  3.3% 
Ireland  5.6 
Italy  5.4  9~.4  5.7% 
Luxembourg  1.7 
Netherlands  3.5  25.7  13.6% 
Portugal  13.2 
Spain  0.8  55.2  1.4% 
Sweden  17.0 
UK  130.5  82.8  157.6% 
TOTAL  157.7  586.4  26.9% 
(a) Crude oil, condensates, NGL 
table 9 
51 Million Tons 
Total Oil Output 
Inland Consumption 
Output/Consumption 
Crude Oil Imports 
of which: Norway 
Others 
Imports/Consumption 
Crude Oil Exports 
of which: USA/Canada 
UK- Oil Supplv/Demand Developments 1970-95 
0.2 
95.9 
IOOA 
100A 
105% 
1.8 
86.7 
2% 
89.0 
89.0 
103% 
table 10 
5L 
80.5 
79.7 
101% 
46.7 
46.7 
59% 
40.2 
9.2 
Sources: EC!IEA 
127.7 
77A 
165% 
35.6 
0.6 
35.0 
~6% 
83.0 
16.6 
91.6 
81.0 
113% 
52.7 
20.0 
32.5 
65% 
57.0 
19.0 
130.5 
82.8 
158% 
48.0 
2~ . 7 
23.3 
58% 
81.2 
30.6 Million Tons 
Total Oil Output 
Inland Consumption 
Output/Consumption 
Crude Oil Imports 
of which: Norway 
FSU 
Middle East 
Imports/Consumption 
Denmark - Oil Supplv/Dcmand Developments 1970-95 
17.7 
10.0 
6.2 
35% 
0.1 
1~ . 9 
1% 
7.9 
0.4 
6.1 
~1 % 
table lOa 
0.3 
13.5 
2% 
6.8 
1.2 
1.7 
50% 
Sources: ECIIEA 
2.9 
10.6 
27% 
5.1 
0.7 
1.1 
-l8% 
6.0 
'8.3 
72% 
4.8 
u 
0.6 
1.7 
58% 
9.2 
9.-l 
98% 
6.7 
4.0 
1.8 
71% UK & DA..l~ISH  L~DIGENOUS  OIL PRODUCTION 
AND GROSS INLAND CONSUMPTION OF EUR-15 
1992  1993  1994  1995 
Crude and LNG production 
UK  9-+,2  99,4  126,4  130,2 
DK  7,8  8,3  9,1  9,2 
UK+ DK  102,0  107,7  135,5  139,-+ 
Gross Inland Consumption  5-+0,2  534,8  537,2  547,7 
ofEUR- 15 
Share of UK+ DK  18,9%  20,1%  25,2%  25,5% 
oil production in Gross 
Inland Consumption of 
EUR-15 
Sources : Eurostat and OECD/IEA Statistics 
table 11 
Million metric tons 
1996 
131,6 
10,3 
141,9 
553,6 
25,6% European Union:  Jet Fuel Sales 1994 
Million Tons  Source: lEA 
Austria  0.2  0.2  0.4  +6.8% 
Belgium  0.1  0.8  0.9  -0.7% 
Denmark  0.1  0.6  0.7  +2.1% 
Finland  0.1  0.2  0.3  -8.9% 
France  0.8  3.6  4.4  +4.1% 
Germany  0.6  5.2  5.8  +2.4% 
Greece  0.5  0.8  1.3  -3.1% 
Ireland  0.4  0.4  +9.1% 
Italy  N/A  N/A  2.8  +6.8% 
Luxembourg  0.2  0.2  +5.8% 
Netherlands  0.1  2.1  2.2  +10.6% 
Portugal  0.1  0.5  0.6  +0.9% 
Spain  0.9  1.9  2.8  +7.1% 
Sweden  0.4  0.4  0.8  +8.1% 
UK  2.2  5.1  7.3  +3.1% 
TOTAL  N/A  NIA  30.9  +3.9% 
N/A- not aYailable/applicable  --Less than 100,000 tons 
Note: Split of  jet fuel  sales betwen international/domestic has some definitional uncertainties. 
table 12 European Union:  International Marine Bunker Sales 1995 
Million Tons  Sourc-es: EC/IEA 
Austria  4.2  2.0  9.1 
Belgium  0.7  3.2  3.9  9.5  2.5  15.9  7%  128%  25% 
Denmark  0.6  1.0  1.6  4.1  0.9  7.7  15%  111%  21% 
Finland  0.1  0.1  0.2  3.7  1.6  7.6  3%  6% 
"'01 
.) / 0 
France  0.2  2.2  2.4  40.8  6.4  67.4  1%  34%  4% 
Germany  0.5  1.6  2.1  61.0  9.5  106.5  1%  17%  2% 
Greece  1.0  2.6  3.6  5.0  3.2  12.1  20%  81%  30% 
Ireland  0.1  0.1  0.2  2.1  1.3  5.3  5%  8%  4% 
Italy  0.6  1.9  2.5  24.7  30.9  77.5  2%  6%  3%) 
Luxembourg  0.9  0.1  1.7 
Netherlands  2.3  9.3  11.6  5.9  1.2  13.8  39%  . 775%  84% 
Portugal  0.2  0.3  0.5  3.1  4.0  9.6  6%  7%  5% 
Spain  0.8  2.5  3.3  18.2  10.9  41.1  4%  23%  8% 
Sweden  0.2  0.9  1.1  5.3  2.9  13.2  401  i'O  31%  8 ~;) 
UK  1.1  1.4  2.5  21.3  11.1  64.6  5%  13%  J ll; 
.  ' 0 
TOTAL  8.4  27.0  35.4  209.9  88.5  453.1  40/  10  31%  so/  / 0 
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International Marine Bunkers 
Million tons 
1970  1995 
Austria  0.0  0.0 
Belgium  2.7  3.9 
Denmark  0.5  1.6 
Finland  0.1  0.2 
France  3.9  2.4 
Germany  4.2  2.1 
Greece  0.5  3.6 
Ireland  0.2  0.1 
Italy  6.9  2.5 
Luxembourg  0.0  0.0 
Netherlands  8.7  11.6 
Portugal  0.7  0.5 
Spain  2.0  3.2 
Sweden  1.2  1.1 
UK  5.5  2.5 
TOTAL EU-15  37.0  35.4 
100°/o 
graph 5 Comparison by Country of EU-15 
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graph 6 ANSWERS TO THE S:MEs IMP  ACT ASSESS:MENT FORM 
1.  The Community dimension is evident in the sense that, in today's global economy, 
the Community must be able to protect the economic interests of  its Member States 
when  they  are  threatened  by  oil  disruptions.  Stockholding  mechanisms  are 
organised  at  Community  level  in  order  to  be  more  coherent,  efficient  and 
transparent and be in line with Community solidarity. 
2.  The proposal will  affect  refiners,  importers  and  distributors  of crude  oil  and  oil 
products  in  the  Community.  Refineries  today  cover  the  bulk  of stockholding 
obligation. Independent storage operators, importers and distributors have an  ever 
increasing stake in  oil  product sales  and  therefore in  the  stockholding  obligation 
associated with these sales.  S:MEs involved include importers, distributors and tank 
storage operators. Their number and size differ from one Member State to another. 
3.  Enterprises trading oil products must comply with national provisions implementing 
the Community Directive. In general, in Member States with stocks held solely by 
the  companies  (industry  stocks),  it  is  the  market  operators  who  ensure  the 
maintenance of stocks of 90 days based on the previous year's oil consumption. In 
Member States with stocks held  solely  - or largely - by  a stockholding body  or 
entity, the stockholding obligation is usually distributed evenly across the operators-
members ofthis entity. 
, 4.  The implementing details which will  be adopted by each Member State internally 
can largely influence economic effects on enterprises. Employment will not normally 
be affected. The creation of  new businesses may be affected: this Directive Proposal 
makes sure that stockholding arrangements are transparent and that market players 
operate on a level playing field in the Community avoiding any discrimination. Such 
arrangements are expected to increase enterprise competitiveness. 
5  ~  The specific situations of S:ME enterprises has been fully  considered.  The aim is to 
have efficient stockholding arrangements organised with transparency.  The option 
of establishing  special  stockholding  bodies  (existing  already  in  many  Member 
States)  and  the  identification  of  stockholding  costs  aim  to  provide  more 
transparency and neutrality in the market. These concepts are in favour of SME oil 
trading/storage enterprises. Subsidiarity would suggest that implementation of  these 
concepts is left to Member States. 
6.  UPEI: Union Petroliere Europeenne Independante.(non-refiners). 
EUROPIA: European Petroleum Industry Association (refiners). ISSN 0254-1475 
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